Editorial

UNIDAD DE ANÁLISIS POLÍTICO Y SEGURIDAD CORPORATIVA

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

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GLOBAL

Europe Takes to the Streets: From Paris to a Continental Wave of Protests

Between September and November, several European countries became the scene of social mobilisations, demonstrations and episodes of public disorder, ranging from peaceful expressions of discontent to violent clashes. One of the first focal points was France, specifically the Paris metropolitan area, where, on 17 September, students from Saint-Exupéry High School, located in Créteil, launched a series of peaceful demonstrations towards the southwestern outskirts of the capital. The protests reflected dissatisfaction with the conditions of the French education system, particularly the lack of resources, teacher shortages and concerns regarding the quality of education (RTÉ, 2026; Le Monde, 2026).

This episode marked the beginning of a pattern of expanding mobilisations, first spreading to other educational institutions in the Paris region and subsequently to several French cities, before reaching other European countries, including Spain, Italy and Germany, among others. This pattern can be analysed through the theory of social movement diffusion, according to which mobilisation experiences, their demands and their repertoires of action are adopted by other actors who identify with similar grievances. In this process, social media and news outlets act as amplifying channels by facilitating the circulation of calls to action, images and narratives that extend protests and encourage the articulation of discontent across different European settings (McAdam & Rucht, 1993; Tarrow, 2005).

As the mobilisations spread to other French cities and different European countries, the protests evolved from peaceful demonstrations into episodes of violence and public disorder. Cities such as Paris, Lille, Barcelona, Nice, Madrid, Marseille, Rome, Milan, Frankfurt, Brussels and Berlin experienced road blockades, transport disruptions and clashes between demonstrators and security forces. These events resulted in public disorder and material damage to both public property and private commercial premises, including small businesses and outlets belonging to large multinational corporations (El Comercio, 2026; UNO Entre Ríos, 2026).

The scale of these mobilisations provides an indication of the continental reach of this phenomenon. According to an analysis of data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), more than 1,700 protests and riots involving at least 100 participants were recorded across 31 European countries between 15 September and 30 October 2026. France accounted for more than 1,200 events, followed by Spain with 173, Italy with 160, Germany with 70 and Portugal with 33. Although the intensity and number of mobilisations varied across countries, the protests were not confined to the French case; rather, they spread across much of the continent and were primarily associated with shortcomings in education, the cost of living, wages, access to housing and various deficiencies in public services (Duggal, 2026).

This situation has generated problems across several areas of these European societies, particularly the economic, political and security spheres. Economically, as previously mentioned, businesses of all sizes have been affected by violent attacks on their premises, disruptions to supply chains caused by road blockades and declining sales resulting from the reduced presence of customers not involved in the protests.
At the epicentre of this wave of mobilisations, France, the economic consequences of the unrest have significantly affected the commercial sector. According to estimates by the French Chamber of Commerce (2026), approximately 2,400 businesses were affected by episodes of violence, while the economic losses resulting from material damage and disruptions to commercial activity are estimated at nearly USD 2 billion. This has been compounded by a decline in consumer confidence, which reached its lowest level in 13 years in October.
The impact is particularly significant given the approaching Christmas season, as November and December typically account for nearly 40% of annual French retail turnover. Meanwhile, CCI France estimated that damage to commercial establishments would exceed EUR 1 billion, highlighting the scale of the impact on the country's business sector and economic activity (Parodi & Reid, 2026; CCI France, 2026).

Italy has also experienced economic disruption resulting from the mobilisations, particularly due to blockades organised by transport workers along major routes used for the supply and distribution of goods. These disruptions have hindered the transportation of products to various commercial establishments, leading to shortages of certain food items in supermarkets and retail outlets, including meat, pasta and cheese, which are staples of the Italian diet. This situation has affected commercial activity and demonstrated how supply chain disruptions can transmit the effects of protests to different sectors of the national economy.



In the political sphere, the repercussions of these mobilisations have become evident across several European countries, placing considerable pressure on their governments and generating conditions of social instability that complicate governance and conflict management. Similarly, these demonstrations have highlighted questions surrounding institutional legitimacy and public confidence in incumbent governments, particularly regarding their ability to address social demands and manage expressions of discontent.

Furthermore, the mobilisations have extended beyond the national political sphere, prompting statements from international organisations. In this regard, the United Nations (UN) expressed concern over clashes between demonstrators and police forces, calling for respect for citizens' rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. The organisation's High Commissioner for Human Rights also questioned the excessive use of force by authorities in their handling of some of these demonstrations, highlighting the importance of safeguarding fundamental rights even in situations involving public disorder (Noticias ONU, 2026).

In terms of security, the countries involved have also experienced disruptions arising from the events described above, including road blockades, clashes between demonstrators and security forces, and attacks against public and private facilities and property. These dynamics have not only compromised the physical security of individuals and buildings but have also generated risks to food security due to disruptions in supply chains, as well as to environmental security as a result of the use of explosive devices and chemical agents, such as tear gas, during confrontations (Espitia, 2021). From a multidimensional security perspective, these impacts therefore extend beyond the physical domain and affect other dimensions that influence the well-being of the population and the functioning of societies.



In response to this situation, some European political leaders have attributed the episodes of violence and destruction recorded during the mobilisations to the involvement of extremist groups, distinguishing them from peaceful demonstrations. In France, President Emmanuel Macron stated that peaceful protesting students should not be confused with those responsible for violent acts, which he attributed to far-left groups and individuals who allegedly took advantage of the mobilisations to commit crimes, primarily burglaries in homes and commercial establishments (El País, 2026). Meanwhile, in Italy, Francesco Filini, a member of parliament from Fratelli d'Italia, the party of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, also held far-left groups responsible for the acts of destruction recorded during the protests (El Diario Alerta, 2026).

In conclusion, the mobilisations recorded across Europe can be analysed through the theory of social movement diffusion and the so-called snowball effect, whereby the initial demonstrations helped bring expressions of discontent to public attention and spread them to other cities and countries. These events also reveal various forms of social dissatisfaction associated with government decisions and policies that, from the demonstrators' perspective, have adversely affected different sectors of the population, particularly education, access to housing and overall living conditions. This scenario highlights growing questions surrounding institutional legitimacy and a potential erosion of public confidence in certain European governments, factors that help explain the persistence of the mobilisations and the search for collective platforms for expressing discontent.

Nevertheless, it is also necessary to consider allegations made by certain political leaders regarding the alleged involvement of far-left groups in specific episodes of violence and destruction, as well as the exploitation of these situations by individuals or groups engaged in criminal activities. Consequently, the challenge facing European governments is to distinguish legitimate and peaceful demonstrations from violent acts, guarantee the exercise of fundamental rights and maintain public order, without disregarding the social demands driving these mobilisations.



Brasil y Estados Unidos: reconfiguración política en América y un nuevo impulso para las fuerzas progresistas en el continente.

During the last week of October and the first week of November 2026, two of the most populous countries in the Americas, Brazil and the United States, recorded electoral results favouring left-wing and centre-left political forces. In Brazil, the presidential election run-off was held on 25 October, in which Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva secured re-election with 51.79% of the valid votes, compared with 48.21% obtained by his opponent, Flávio Bolsonaro, representing the Brazilian right wing. This result reversed the advantage Bolsonaro had secured in the first round, when he obtained 47.03% of the vote against Lula's 45.16% (Agência Câmara, 2026).

Meanwhile, on 3 November, during the United States midterm elections, the Democratic Party made significant gains in both Congress and state-level races. According to the preliminary results published by Anadolu Agency (2026) on 4 November, Democrats had secured 54 seats compared with 44 Republicans in the Senate, and 228 compared with 139 in the House of Representatives, placing them on course to control both chambers. At the state level, the party also gained an advantage in gubernatorial races, with 28 Democratic governors compared with 20 Republicans.

These results represented a political setback for Donald Trump and his party, altering the legislative balance of power during the second half of his term and strengthening the Democratic opposition (Anadolu Agency, 2026; Reuters, 2026).

The results of Brazil's presidential election and the legislative and state-level contests in the United States reflect electoral gains for progressive and left-wing forces in two countries with considerable strategic depth, large populations and significant geopolitical weight. This scenario is particularly relevant in the case of the United States, given its influence on the international system and the balance of power across the continent. Consequently, changes in the composition of its political institutions and the orientation of its governments may have repercussions not only for the domestic dynamics of both countries but also for the regional geopolitical landscape, particularly regarding bilateral and multilateral relations, the definition of key foreign policy priorities and their engagement with other states across the continent.

The shift in the balance of power within the US Congress, combined with the results of state gubernatorial elections, could have significant implications for Donald Trump's ability to advance his political agenda during the remaining two years of his term. The new Democratic majority in both chambers, which will take office in January 2027, will pose greater obstacles to the approval of legislative proposals put forward by the White House, as well as to federal budget negotiations and other decisions requiring congressional involvement.

These include budgetary authorisations and Congress's constitutional powers regarding the declaration of war. Nevertheless, the president will retain his executive powers, including the power of veto. Therefore, this new scenario does not entail an absolute loss of governing capacity, but rather an environment characterised by greater negotiation and institutional confrontation (CNN, 2026).

Likewise, Democratic control of Congress will allow for increased oversight of the Executive Branch through investigations, hearings and subpoenas directed at administration officials. Scrutiny of Cabinet members could also intensify, potentially creating opportunities for impeachment proceedings against either the president or other senior federal officials, subject to the relevant constitutional grounds and requirements. In this context, the Trump administration will face a legislative opposition with greater capacity to scrutinise its decisions, condition the allocation of resources and restrict the progress of some of its initiatives.



Meanwhile, the results of state gubernatorial elections could also have significant implications for President Donald Trump's administration. The predominance of Democratic governors could lead to a more distant and confrontational relationship between state governments and the White House, particularly in territories where authorities maintain political positions opposed to the directives of the federal Executive Branch. This could weaken the political alignment that previously existed between a large proportion of Republican governors and the president, giving rise to greater criticism and resistance to certain policies promoted by Washington.

One area in which this situation could become particularly evident is immigration policy. Democratic governors could introduce measures to limit cooperation between state and local authorities and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), hindering some of the agency's activities within their respective territories. This could translate into restrictions on information sharing, the involvement of local law enforcement agencies in immigration operations and the use of state resources to support enforcement and deportation efforts. Furthermore, regarding ICE, the new composition of Congress could create opportunities to review, reduce or impose conditions on the budgetary allocations assigned to the agency, potentially affecting its operational capabilities and the scope of its immigration enforcement activities (Uno Tv, 2026).

As a result of these changes in the composition of the US Congress and state governorships, relations between Washington and Latin America could also undergo certain transformations. This is partly due to the region's current political configuration, in which countries such as Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia have right-wing or centre-right governments whose political orientations converge with some of the Trump administration's main proposals, particularly in matters of security, the fight against organised crime and military cooperation.

This political affinity has encouraged closer ties between Washington and several Latin American governments, although it does not necessarily imply complete alignment in their respective agendas and national interests. In this context, it is worth highlighting the initiative promoted by the US Government, known as the Alliance for Combating Crime in the Americas (A3C), commonly referred to as the Shield of the Americas. The initiative has faced criticism from sectors of the Democratic Party, particularly regarding its militarised approach to organised crime threats and the scope of security cooperation.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Democratic opposition in Congress could lead to greater scrutiny of this initiative, as well as of the cooperation agreements and security operations that the United States conducts with its regional allies.

On the other hand, the implications of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's continued presidency in Brazil and the continuity of his progressive political project are particularly significant for the region and the configuration of Latin America's geopolitical landscape, especially in two respects. The first concerns the continuation and strengthening of relations between Brazil and the People's Republic of China, whose economic and strategic presence in the South American country could continue to consolidate during this new presidential term.

This is particularly relevant given Brazil's strategic depth. Due to its territorial size, the country constitutes one of South America's main geographical centres and shares borders with ten countries and territories in the region, including Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Argentina. Consequently, strengthening ties between Brazil and Beijing represents an important factor in the projection of Chinese interests across the continent, particularly in trade, energy, technology and infrastructure, thereby expanding China's presence in a region of strategic importance to competition among the world's major powers.

The second aspect concerns Brazil's position regarding the emergence of a multipolar international order, in which emerging economies and developing powers have a greater role in the main decision-making arenas of the international system. In this regard, Brazil's role within the BRICS group is fundamental. As one of its founding members, Brazil has promoted greater cooperation among emerging economies, as well as reforms to global governance institutions.

Furthermore, Lula's government has supported initiatives aimed at reducing dependence on the US dollar in international trade transactions by encouraging greater use of national currencies in exchanges between member countries. This position challenges the centrality of the dollar within the international financial system and forms part of broader efforts to diversify economic and financial cooperation mechanisms. Such efforts could generate tensions with Washington's strategic interests and introduce another element of competition into its relationship with Brazil and the other members of the bloc.

In conclusion, the electoral results in Brazil and the United States will have repercussions for both countries' domestic political dynamics and the Latin American geopolitical landscape. The continuation of Lula's progressive political project and Democratic gains within US institutions present new challenges for regional relations, particularly in matters of security, military cooperation and foreign policy. This outlook could generate tensions, new alignments and changes in the continent's bilateral and multilateral dynamics amid geopolitical competition among the world's major powers.



Colombia Under Abelardo de la Espriella's Government: Assessment and Challenges of the First 90 Days

On 7 August 2026, Abelardo de la Espriella began his presidential term following his inauguration in the city of Cali, formally assuming the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the Head of State. His rise to power was preceded by an electoral campaign characterised by a significant symbolic component, communication strategies aimed at connecting with the electorate, particularly the so-called median voter, and a nationalist discourse focused on restoring security and strengthening state authority (Rubio Marín, n.d.).

His political platform was structured around a central premise: guaranteeing the security of Colombians and protecting national interests through a hard-line policy against criminal organisations. This approach envisaged a forceful response against structures that threatened the civilian population, the Military and Police Forces, as well as the environment and the country's social stability. Consequently, strengthening military and police capabilities, together with reaffirming the role of the Public Force in defending national territory and sovereignty, occupied a central position in his electoral discourse.

From the first day of his administration, Abelardo de la Espriella had an established ministerial cabinet, whose appointments began to signal the political direction he intended to give each ministry and the ideological sectors that would be represented within the Executive Branch. Among the most significant appointments was that of the Ministry of Defence, for which he appointed retired Major General Jorge Mora, a military officer with extensive operational and strategic experience, politically identified with right-wing sectors and who had supported the president throughout his electoral campaign. This appointment demonstrated the importance the new administration intended to place on the military component of its security and defence policy (El Universal, 2026).

Foto: EFE



Meanwhile, the appointment of Paola Holguín as Minister of Cultures reflected another of the president's ideological priorities: promoting the so-called cultural battle, aimed at challenging what his political discourse identifies as the woke agenda. At the Ministry of the Interior, Rodrigo Lara initially assumed the position. However, his subsequent resignation and the appointment of Alejandro Ordóñez as his replacement revealed a shift towards a political profile more closely aligned with conservative sectors and the traditional right, with which Ordóñez has greater affinity than his predecessor. This change may have been related, among other factors, to the Government's difficulties in securing the approval of the General National Budget (PGN) during the legislative process. Although the Executive Branch reportedly obtained the necessary majority in the corresponding vote, the bill's approval was ultimately jeopardised by a procedural irregularity in the legislative process (Semana, 2026; El Espectador, 2026).

This orientation was also reflected in the administration's initial decisions regarding security and defence. In line with the hard-line discourse that characterised his campaign, Abelardo de la Espriella's Government promoted a strategy focused on intensifying military operations and deploying offensive capabilities against the country's main illegal armed groups. During its first 90 days, this policy materialised in airstrikes, high-precision operations and actions by the Public Force aimed at weakening these organisations' operational and territorial capabilities (Impacto News, 2026).

Nevertheless, the implementation of this strategy was accompanied by mixed results. Although military operations resulted in reported casualties and arrests of members of criminal organisations, incidents also occurred that demonstrated the persistence of these groups' operational and retaliatory capabilities. These included attacks against military and police units, the use of explosives and drones against the Public Force, as well as the kidnapping of members of security institutions, including a female Army Second Lieutenant (Publimetro, 2026). These developments posed a challenge for the administration, as they demonstrated that intensifying the military offensive did not automatically translate into a reduction in threats against the population and state institutions.



Regarding crime statistics, a comparison between January–September 2025 and the same period in 2026 reveals differentiated trends. Kidnapping recorded a 40% reduction in the number of victims (554 to 330) and a 2% decrease in cases (243 to 237). Likewise, extortion-related kidnapping decreased by 55%, sexual offences by 6%, theft from individuals by 6% and commercial theft by 19%. Reductions were also recorded in cargo theft (-63%), motor vehicle theft (-5%) and crimes against natural resources and the environment (-2%). Meanwhile, intentional homicide remained virtually unchanged, declining from 10,469 to 10,432 victims. In contrast, extortion increased by 3% and acts of terrorism by 4%. There was also a 14% increase in both the number of victims of massacres (253 to 289) and the number of recorded cases (72 to 82) (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2026).

In terms of the fight against drug trafficking, manual eradication of coca crops increased by 50%, rising from 5,687 to 8,549 hectares. However, cocaine seizures decreased by 6% (781.8 to 734.2 kg) and heroin seizures by 69% (410 to 128 kg), while marijuana seizures increased by 7% (331.6 to 355.5 tonnes). Overall, these indicators demonstrate progress in certain operational activities, but also unfavourable trends in specific crimes and uneven results in the fight against illicit economies (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2026).

Finally, it is important to clarify that these figures correspond to the January–September 2026 period and therefore include several months prior to Abelardo de la Espriella's inauguration on 7 August. Consequently, they cannot be attributed entirely to his administration or considered an assessment exclusively covering his first 90 days in office. Nevertheless, they provide a reference point for contextualising the security conditions inherited by the Government and identifying the trends against which its performance will need to be assessed.

In conclusion, during its first months in office, Abelardo de la Espriella's Government has delivered mixed results in terms of security. Progress has been recorded in reducing certain crime indicators and strengthening specific operational activities. However, setbacks persist, highlighting the scale of the outstanding challenges: the increase in massacres, extortion and acts of terrorism, as well as the decline in cocaine and heroin seizures. Consequently, the administration will need to strengthen its intelligence, interdiction and territorial control capabilities to improve results against illicit economies and reduce threats affecting the population and the Public Force. It is important to reiterate that the indicators analysed include months prior to the beginning of his presidential term; therefore, it remains premature to attribute these results exclusively to his administration.



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Note. The research and investigative work and analysis contained in this report is exclusive to 3+ Security Colombia. Therefore, it is recommended not to disclose the document in question. 3+Security Colombia Ltda., reserves the right to interpretation that may arise by the reader in the review and visualization of the information presented.

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