



Editorial

UNIDAD DE ANÁLISIS POLÍTICO Y SEGURIDAD CORPORATIVA

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

GLOBAL

A Ceasefire Disguised as "Peace": The Fault Lines of the Washington–Tehran Agreement

REGIONAL

The Remilitarization of the War on Drugs in Latin America

LOCAL

What Does Abelardo de la Espriella's Election Mean for Colombia (2026–2030)?

A Ceasefire Disguised as “Peace”: The Fault Lines of the Washington–Tehran Agreement

The understanding announced on June 14, 2026, between the United States and Iran has been framed as the conclusion of a war that, for three and a half months, set the Middle East ablaze and strangled the global energy market. However, in agreements of this kind, it is worth examining the fine print: this is a memorandum of understanding that extends the ceasefire between the two countries for sixty days and leaves the fate of Iran’s nuclear program unresolved, pending further negotiations. Its first tangible gesture—and the most sensitive for markets—is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, with a formal signing scheduled in Geneva under the mediation of Pakistan and Oman. Calling it “peace” is, strictly speaking, premature. It is, rather, a transactional truce that buys time and stabilizes oil prices while postponing the question that triggered the war ([CFR, 2026](#); [The Hill, 2026](#)).

That question is a nuclear wound, and it remains open. The U.S. president himself acknowledged that nearly all points were agreed upon except the only one that truly mattered—the nuclear issue—and described Iran as “inflexible.”

Tehran, for its part, stated that the agreement was “inches away” while denouncing broad demands. The fifteen-point U.S. plan, leaked in March, required Iran to cease using proxy militias in the region and to halt funding and arming allied groups such as Hezbollah. In return, the memorandum contemplates the unfreezing of approximately \$24 billion in Iranian funds, half of which would be released before final negotiations begin. Thus, the architecture of the agreement monetizes de-escalation and organizes logistical aspects while deferring the core of the conflict—enrichment, ballistic missiles, and sanctions—to a sixty-day timeline whose resolution remains at the very least, uncertain ([NBC News, 2026](#)).

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The major absentee from the table is Israel, and its omission reveals the most significant strategic fracture of the moment. Although not a party to the agreement, Jerusalem views it with suspicion, considering it insufficient. Netanyahu described it as a decision by Trump and emphasized that Israel maintains its own interests, particularly regarding the Iranian nuclear threat. The opposition has been harsher, with figures such as Yair Lapid and Yair Golan describing it as a historic failure that leaves nuclear infrastructure intact while channeling billions to Tehran. The backdrop is electoral but also doctrinal, since in contrast to Washington's de-escalatory and commercial logic, Israel maintains a more stringent posture. Netanyahu warned that his "finger remains on the trigger" and that he is ready to return to combat at any moment, while refusing to withdraw from territories captured in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. An agreement of this magnitude, under these conditions, does not close the front—it freezes it, under a visibly strained U.S.-Israel alliance ([PBS News, 2026](#)).

However, the most volatile front is the Lebanese one, which operates on a parallel track. Following the 2024 war that severely weakened Hezbollah and pushed its forces north of the Litani River, the Shiite group was diminished but not eliminated. Accordingly, the United States negotiated a separate truce, and on April 16 announced a ten-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, with Beirut

demanding Israeli withdrawal and Tel Aviv insisting on Hezbollah's disarmament. The Lebanese government of Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam has made progress toward disarmament, but the militia resists. Its leader, Naim Qassem, warned of retaliation against Israeli attacks, while the Speaker of Parliament conditioned disarmament on Israel meeting its obligations first. A fragile additional ceasefire agreed in Washington in early June—without Hezbollah's participation—barely maintains calm. It is precisely this southern Lebanon front that, according to multiple observers, could derail the broader understanding with Iran ([Al Jazeera, 2026](#)).

Therefore, what emerges is not a new regional order but a pause laden with uncertainties. Iran's "axis of resistance" has been hollowed out— Hamas devastated in Gaza, where Palestinian deaths exceed 73,000, and Hezbollah contained—but Washington's formula appears to deliberately conflate the end of hostilities with conflict resolution. A nuclear program whose technical knowledge remains intact, an Israel that reserves the right to veto by force, a Hezbollah unwilling to subordinate itself, and a sixty-day negotiation without guarantees form a balance based more on exhaustion than convergence of interests. While Trump's transactional diplomacy can showcase the reopening of Hormuz and silenced missiles as a success, as long as the core issues remain unresolved, the prudent interpretation is that this is a fragile truce—not peace.

The Remilitarization of the War on Drugs in Latin America

The hemisphere's security map is being reordered under a premise that the White House no longer conceals. The National Security Strategy dubbed the "Donroe doctrine" is a vision that turns the counternarcotics struggle into its operational vehicle. The capture of Nicolás Maduro in January and the more than 200 deaths in strikes on "narco-boats" were its opening; but what is truly novel is the proliferation of joint military operations on sovereign Latin American soil. Read through the categories of complex interdependence, the phenomenon is paradoxical, since force returns to the center, and interdependence reveals itself less "complex" than asymmetric, with Washington capable of turning others' dependency into political leverage.

In March 2026 Ecuador inaugurated this model, when it became the first country in the region to host joint operations with Southern Command against groups categorized as "narco-terrorists," following a meeting in Quito between Noboa and General Francis Donovan; since then, combined forces have sunk a narco-submarine and destroyed camps such as that of the leader "Mono Tole" in Sucumbíos. Noboa's argument to legitimize these operations is that nearly 70% of the world's cocaine flows through Ecuadorian ports, normalizing the surrender of autonomy in exchange for intelligence, drones and

designations from Washington such as those placed on Los Lobos and Los Choneros ([Diario Libre, 2026](#); [Panorama Ecuador, 2026](#)). But sovereign tension emerges; in November 2025 Ecuadorians rejected in a referendum the installation of foreign military bases, precisely what Noboa promotes.

Now, Venezuela exposes the rawest version of that asymmetry. On June 12, Southern Command executed a lethal strike against Héctor Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero” — top leader of the Tren de Aragua— in southeastern Bolívar, within the Orinoco Mining Arc; Caracas confirmed the death and acknowledged CIA intelligence support and specialized technical assistance, within the framework of its own offensive against criminal structures controlling illegal mining ([Descifrado, 2026](#)). That the government of Delcy Rodríguez, whom Trump warned would pay an even greater price than Maduro if she did not “do the right thing,” now collaborates with those who overthrew her predecessor illustrates coercion as the cement that sustains these agreements. Even so, Guerrero’s death rests on strikingly fragile evidence: the only record is a roughly ten-second video—an aerial shot of a structure with a metal roof and an explosion, with no bodies or people in sight—the corpse appeared next to the residence, identity took days to confirm, and residents claim the gangs were warned three days in advance and that several leaders escaped. The information is unverified and clashes with the announced result but anticipates the distance between the spectacle of decapitation and its verification. ([Vanguardia, 2026](#); [Infobae, 2026](#)).

This operation, more than a counternarcotics blow, is the execution phase of a reordering of the Mining Arc to align it with Washington. The economic background is explicit: on March 4 the Secretary of the Interior, Doug Burgum,



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traveled to Caracas with more than twenty mining companies to meet with Rodríguez and Cabello; the Trump administration is negotiating with Minerven the sale of up to one ton of gold (around 165 million dollars, with Trafigura as transporter) and, on May 1, the Venezuelan Mining Corporation signed a memorandum with the U.S. firm Heeney Capital whose guaranteed purchases project between 2.2 and 5.2 billion dollars annually, all under the umbrella of a new Mining Law and an announced increase of at least 30% in gold production for 2026. For years, criminal syndicates distributed gold, diamonds and coltan through agreements with authorities and companies of Chinese and Russian origin; what the interim government now clears away—Tren de Aragua, syndicates and Colombian guerrillas, including Humberto Martes, alias “Humbertico,” master of illegal mining at Kilometer 88—is not only crime, but criminal control and Chinese-Russian presence that will be replaced by U.S. operators ([El Universo, 2026](#); [Bitácora Económica, 2026](#); [EFE, 2026](#)). Caracas is paying with territory and gold for the legitimacy and economic oxygen it needs, while the Mining Arc becomes a geoeconomic asset under U.S. tutelage.



For its part, Central America shows how pressure is exerted in chain form. Guatemala became the second country to accept combined operations. Arévalo and Secretary Hegseth closed the terms in a call on May 19, with operations that could begin in a matter of weeks, although the president denied that they were joint operations and specified that they would be actions led by Guatemalan forces without foreign troops. Honduras is the most recent link, as on June 16 the Honduran Chief of Staff confirmed that Washington and Tegucigalpa are discussing “combat operations” against organized crime and that President Nasry Asfura will decide when the U.S. army may act, relying on the old Soto Cano-Palmerola base and a DEA and CIA presence that never left (The New York Times, 2026).

This could force other countries to accept direct cooperation and normalize U.S. military presence throughout the region, with the Western Hemisphere as the “number one priority.” The contradiction is that the recomposition of Honduran gangs is partly the result of Pentagon operations in the Caribbean—the classic balloon effect. Finally, a political reverse laid the project bare: the “Hondurasgate.” The leak

at the end of April of 37 audios attributed to the circle of Juan Orlando Hernández, former president convicted of drug trafficking in the United States and pardoned by Trump. The recordings would describe a scheme aligning the Honduran right with the Republican Party, Israel and Milei’s Argentina to finance Asfura’s victory, restore Hernández and fund, with public money, a disinformation machinery against Petro and Sheinbaum. A pardoned narco-president operating as a regional hinge under the anti-drug banner demonstrates the extent to which the fight against drug trafficking is the façade of ideological realignment (La Silla Vacía, 2026; Latinoamerica21, 2026; El Mostrador, 2026).

However, Mexico is the counterpoint that defines the limits of the doctrine. The assassination of Nemesio Oseguera, “El Mencho,” on February 22, 2026, was carried out exclusively by Mexican forces, with no U.S. participation; Claudia Sheinbaum has rejected joint operations and, together with Colombia and Brazil, was excluded from the “Shield of the Americas.” But in Mexico’s case, the death of “El Mencho” unleashed a succession war between “El 03,” “El Sapo” and “El Jardinero”—the latter captured by the Navy in April—while the CJNG continues operating in around 40 countries. In this scenario, the parallel with the Tren de Aragua is revealing, since an



organization that already functioned as a decentralized franchise survives the fall of its most visible face with greater ease and adaptability (Caribe Peninsular, 2026). In this type of structure, eliminating leadership produces fragmentation and media trophies, not the defeat of Transnational Organized Crime networks that are, by design, resilient and malleable.

In the end, what is being constructed is not a more effective anti-drug policy, but an architecture of domination whose currency is the exchange of sovereignty for security and political protection. The admission criterion is ideological—left-wing governments are excluded, pressured or, like Venezuela, intervened—and the real reward is geopolitical, beginning with blocking China, securing strategic resources (from Venezuelan oil

to Orinoco gold) and rebuilding hemispheric supply chains. This maintains structural asymmetry. The United States sets the terms and partners absorb the costs (legal, sovereign and reputational) of a war whose script is written in Washington. This represents a filter already beginning to operate at the ballot box as well, with the narrow victory of Abelardo de la Espriella in the runoff on June 21, backed by Trump and immediately embraced by Washington, outlining Colombia's transition from the excluded bloc to that of aligned partners. Meanwhile, cartels are the mobilizing pretext; the real project—and its sustainability in the face of mutating criminal networks, societies that reject military tutelage and a China that observes—remains the great unknown that narratives of “decisive blows against crime” still refuse to answer.



Analysis Team

UNIDAD DE ANÁLISIS POLÍTICO Y SEGURIDAD CORPORATIVA



Andrea Mojica
Senior Consultant



Camilo Jácome
Junior Consultant

What Does Abelardo de la Espriella's Election Mean for Colombia (2026–2030)?

Abelardo De La Espriella is Colombia's new president. On June 21, Abelardo de la Espriella — criminal lawyer, businessman and “outsider” of the Defensores de la Patria movement— defeated Iván Cepeda in the presidential runoff with around 49.7% versus 48.7%: a difference of some 250,000 votes, less than one percentage point. The result, still in the pre-count phase and pending official scrutiny, arrives contested, as Cepeda announced claims over some 33,000 polling tables and President Petro cast doubts on the count before clarifying that it “adheres to the judges.” With record participation of more than 26 million voters (around 63% of the electoral roll), the country is split almost in half and closes the cycle of Petrismo in the Casa de Nariño. De la Espriella will take office on August 7 with a narrow mandate in vote

difference but ambitious in program: he has anticipated the signing of nearly 90 decrees on the first day. The question, then, is not only what he will do, but with what real margin he will be able to do it (Acento, 2026).

Economically, the program is supply-side and deregulation; tax reduction and simplification for companies, drastic reduction in the size of the State (merging nineteen ministries into ten, payroll cuts, elimination of agencies), strict compliance with the fiscal rule and a growth target as high as it is unlikely, of up to 7% per year.

LOCAL

The signal to investment is deliberate, with fewer procedures, modernization of the tax authority with Artificial Intelligence, subsidized housing loans, and a vice-presidential formula that provides technical credibility to markets that had already rewarded the candidate's rise with an upward "electoral trade." But the context is adverse: there is a high fiscal deficit, slowdown and serious doubts about how campaign promises will be financed, aggravated by the new president's lack of administrative experience. The productive axis is extractive and attractive for investors—domestic and foreign—with the promise of legal certainty and technical criteria (Diario de Occidente, 2026). Even so, it faces a clear risk: an agenda without legislative muscle to sustain it.

On the other hand, security is the core of the political project and the point where Colombia aligns with hemispheric reordering. De la Espriella buries "Total Peace," prioritizes the state offensive and recovery of territorial control, promises ten megaprisons—in the Bukele style—a First Line of Security with reservists and veterans, a search bloc against extortion and the eradication of 330,000 hectares of coca through aerial spraying, asset forfeiture, substitution and extradition. In addition, on this specific issue cooperation with Washington deepens. Marco Rubio congratulated the president-elect as soon as the result was known and offered to work "closely" on regional security, migration and economic ties; Milei and Noboa immediately celebrated. Read through the thread of the Donroe doctrine, the data is clear: the

ideological admission criterion governing the regional board is this time satisfied at the ballot box, without the need for pressure or intervention (CAMBIO, 2026).

This same agenda opens the front of rights and the rule of law. The prison model inspired by El Salvador carries international questioning over detention conditions and guarantees; the return of aerial spraying and the bet on fracking raise environmental alarms; and suggestions of reviewing permanence in the OAS and the UN point to a withdrawal from multilateral oversight frameworks. The promise not to persecute opponents coexists with a start of government by decree and hardline rhetoric that, when transferred to the terrain of armed conflict, strains respect for International Humanitarian Law (SEMANA, 2026). Here it is emphasized that the legal certainty offered to capital does not equate to legal certainty for citizens. They are two distinct dimensions, and the new government will have to demonstrate whether it can sustain both simultaneously.

The real limit could be shown by the Congress elected on March 8, which left the Pacto Histórico—once again in opposition—as the largest force, with 62 seats between House and Senate; the Centro Democrático, natural ally of the new government, came second with around 45 seats, and the traditional parties—Liberal, Conservative and La U—again become kingmakers. Thus, De La Espriella will govern with a divided Legislature in which the largest bloc is openly hostile to him, and will depend on coalitions to move forward with tax and state-cut reforms that today are not yet

secured, although he will likely obtain them given the legislative configuration, leaving fewer counterweights in other branches of public power. Hence the bet on ninety decrees. With them he can set command from the Executive while negotiating a consistent majority. Congress is installed on July 20 and Cepeda, as runner-up, will occupy a Senate seat under the Opposition Statute (El Colombiano, 2026).

In line with this, Petrismo does not disappear but transforms and has unprecedented popular backing. Petro alternated questioning the pre-count— “no president can be proclaimed”—with a call for calm and respect for judges, an ambivalence that keeps the narrative of fraud alive without fully crossing the institutional line. Cepeda recognized the result as non-binding and intensified the dispute with challenges. Now there will be two key movements; a contested leadership of the opposition between Petro—tempted by a role of regional leadership of the left—and Cepeda, who arrives at the Senate with his own capital. Secondly, the possible reactivation of the constituent assembly that the government had postponed so as not to burden the campaign; a banner that, if revived, would come accompanied by social mobilization. The streets already gave signals on election night, with blockades, tire burnings and attacks on police stations and public transport in Bogotá and Cali, while the electoral authority, business groups and international observation missions called for calm and referred doubts to legal mechanisms. The governance risk, therefore, is not only legislative, but particularly of legitimacy, with an incoming Executive whose election does not represent nearly half of Colombians (SEMANA, 2026; QHubo Medellín, 2026).



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
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