



SECURITY OVERVIEW

Sao Paulo – Brazil

Political Analysis and Corporate
Security Unit - UAPSC

April 10, 2026.

Urban Security Overview

Sao Paulo, Brazil

1. Executive Summary

In recent years, the administration of Mayor Ricardo Nunes has achieved significant progress in reducing the homicide rate and other high-impact crimes—indicators that have historically had a profound effect on the population of the city of São Paulo. This evolution has contributed to a partial recovery of public trust in state institutions, as well as to a relatively more positive perception of urban security management. In this context, local security forces have been endowed with greater operational capabilities, most notably through the incorporation of advanced surveillance technologies such as next-generation cameras and drones, aimed at strengthening control over critical areas and enhancing crime prevention.

Nevertheless, these advances coexist with a persistent gap between violent crime indicators and public perception, particularly with regard to thefts and robberies. For a broad segment of the population, the sense of insecurity in everyday life remains unchanged or has even intensified, especially in situations such as the use of ATMs or the visible use of mobile devices in public spaces. Organized crime continues to be one of the main structural factors shaping the city's security environment. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) maintains significant influence in highly vulnerable neighborhoods and favelas, affecting both security dynamics and territorial governance. This is compounded by the persistence of “Cracolândias,” or open-air drug markets, whose presence negatively affects public perception and erodes the legitimacy of state action in certain urban areas. Street-level drug trafficking, carried out by organizations such as the PCC and, to a lesser extent, the Comando Vermelho (CV), fuels territorial and illicit-rent disputes that keep firearm-related deaths a recurring—albeit uneven—problem across the urban fabric.

Looking ahead to 2026, the São Paulo City Hall continues to place urban security at the center of its strategic agenda, supported by sustained increases in the municipal budget and a firm commitment to technology, territorial presence, and inter-institutional integration. Among the most notable initiatives is the expansion of the Smart Sampa program, which now includes more than 40,000 cameras equipped with artificial-intelligence-based facial recognition, positioning it as one of the largest surveillance systems in Latin America. At the same time, the Metropolitan Civil Guard has been strengthened through the recruitment of


additional personnel, the incorporation of modern equipment and non-lethal weapons, and the implementation of operational coordination schemes with the State Government for joint patrols. Overall, this model projects a scenario of enhanced control and response capacity, albeit accompanied by significant challenges. These include data management and protection, debates over the social legitimacy of the intensive use of surveillance technologies, and the persistence of pockets of urban vulnerability where improvements are not distributed equitably. Up to early 2026, technological systems have contributed to thousands of arrests, but they have also generated concerns regarding operational errors, privacy issues, and wrongful detentions.

Additionally, the implementation of performance-based bonuses and performance management schemes within police forces has sparked a significant debate over the legality and proportionality of certain interventions. In this context, although overall violence shows a downward trend, concerns persist regarding deaths resulting from police interventions and the effectiveness of institutional oversight mechanisms, creating new public-order challenges that, paradoxically, may be perceived by segments of the population as additional sources of insecurity.

In this document, the Political Analysis and Corporate Security Unit (UAPSC) of 3+SC will conduct an Urban Security Assessment of the city of São Paulo, Brazil, through an analysis of the dynamics affecting security, risk factors, and criminal behavior supported by statistical data. The primary objective is to present a diagnostic overview of the city's security situation that enables the construction of prospective scenarios and the formulation of recommendations aimed at the management, mitigation, and control of risks.

2. Risk Assessment

The purpose of this urban risk-level analysis is to identify areas of the city of São Paulo where—according to official institutional statistics—there is a higher probability of violent scenarios occurring and of high-impact crimes materializing. For the Urban Security Assessment – São Paulo 2026, territorial characterization is based on: cases of intentional homicide and cases of theft from persons. The data are drawn from consolidated, publicly available records from the São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security (SSP-SP) and the Military Police.



Source: Prepared by the authors, 2026.

Medium Risk Level: Pinheiros, Vila Mariana, Mooca, Vila María, Ipiranga, Vila Prudente, Santana, Jabaquara and Santo Amaro.

Administrative regions classified as medium risk are characterized by consolidated urban infrastructure, greater institutional presence, and relatively better socioeconomic indicators, which contribute to an enhanced capacity for risk containment. Although common metropolitan-level criminal events—such as thefts, opportunistic robberies, or isolated incidents—are recorded, these areas do not exhibit systematic patterns of organized violence or territorial control by criminal actors. Formal economic activity, road connectivity, and the constant presence of security forces enable predictable risk management, with impacts that are generally limited and controllable through standard preventive security measures and situational monitoring. In these regions, risk dynamics are mainly associated with high pedestrian traffic and commercial activity rather than with structural criminality or persistent social conflict.

Medium-High Risk Level: Sé, Penha, Itaquera, Lapa, Butantá, São Miguel, Emelino Matarazzo, Aricanduva, Freguesia do Ó, Casa Verde, Pirituba, Campo Limpo, Tremembé and Cidade Ademar.

Administrative regions classified as upper-medium risk display greater socio-territorial complexity, combining areas of moderate urban development with zones of social vulnerability,

economic informality, and demographic pressure. In these territories, higher levels of property crime, intermittent presence of criminal groups, and episodes of social unrest—such as protests, road blockages, or community tensions—are observed, potentially generating more significant operational and security impacts. Although state presence exists, its capacity for control is uneven, increasing the likelihood of incidents during specific time periods or in contingent crisis contexts.

Regions such as Sé, Itaquera, Penha, Lapa, Butantã, São Miguel, Campo Limpo, and Pirituba function as transitional risk spaces, where adverse events are not constant but are likely under conditions of high exposure, population concentration, or social escalation. These regions combine frequent property crime, high population flow, and sporadic episodes of urban disorder, reinforcing perceptions of insecurity and highlighting the need for targeted mitigation measures in key areas of the city.

High Risk Level: Perus, São Mateus, Cidade Tiradentes, M’Boi Mirim, Capela do Socorro, Guaianases, Itaim Paulista and Parelheiros.

Administrative regions classified as high risk concentrate structural vulnerability factors, including persistent socioeconomic inequality, high levels of informality, limited effective state presence, and greater influence of illicit economies or organized criminal groups. These territories exhibit a high frequency of violent crime, territorial conflicts, and repeated insecurity incidents, along with a reduced capacity for institutional response and deterrence. The probability of incidents with significant impact—affecting both individuals and operations—is high, particularly at night, in peripheral zones, or during periods of social tension. As such, these regions require reinforced risk-mitigation strategies, permanent monitoring, and differentiated contingency planning, given that risk is systematic rather than merely circumstantial.

3. Crime Trends and analysis

With the aim of identifying and understanding percentage variations and criminal dynamics in the city of São Paulo, the following crime analysis is presented to visualize the figures and trends of the main high-impact crimes recorded during the second half of 2025 and the first quarter of 2026. This analytical exercise examines each crime category in greater depth and the different risk scenarios present across the urban territory, linking recent incidents of insecurity with the specific areas where they have occurred.

Overall, records from the São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security indicate a downward trend in crime indicators at the state level, including the capital. This evolution is particularly evident in crimes against life, whose levels have reached historically low values—especially noteworthy given the high population density and urban complexity that characterize the city of São Paulo.

3.1 Theft in different modalities

In the city of São Paulo, the evolution of theft in its different modalities throughout 2025 showed a clear divergence between robbery and theft. In the Brazilian context, robbery (*roubo*) refers to the taking of property with violence, intimidation, or threat against the victim, whereas theft (*furto*) occurs without violence or threat, often without the victim immediately realizing the crime ([Poder360, 2025](#)). This distinction is fundamental, as both modalities followed different trajectories in the capital over the course of the year.

As of the first half of 2025, the city recorded a sustained reduction in robberies overall. Between January and June, 51,266 cases were reported, representing a 14% decrease compared to the same period in 2024, when 59,677 incidents were recorded. In June alone, robberies declined by 14.5% year-on-year, consolidating a downward trend during the first half of the year. This improvement was also reflected in other categories related to violent property crime, such as vehicle robberies, which fell by 15%, and cargo theft, which decreased by 24.5% over the same period ([Prefeitura de São Paulo, 2025](#)). Between January and May 2025, the city of São Paulo recorded more than 120,000 property crime incidents, consolidating robberies and thefts as the main urban risk factor in the capital. On average, more than 800 incidents were reported daily—equivalent to one criminal event in less than every two minutes—according to official data from the São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security (SSP-SP). While violent robberies continued an overall downward trend in aggregate terms, reaching even the lowest levels of the

historical series for certain months, overall thefts continued to rise, particularly in the capital, with growth exceeding 5% in the cumulative total for the first five months of the year. This behavior reinforces the characterization of São Paulo as a low-lethality-violence environment but with high exposure to opportunistic crime, a central pattern in the risk analysis for the 2025–2026 period ([Interlira, 2025](#)).

However, the behavior of thefts differed. Between January and October 2025, the city of São Paulo recorded 243,121 total thefts, compared to 236,573 in the same period of 2024—an increase of 6,548 cases. This rise was driven primarily by non-vehicle thefts, which increased from 200,768 to 210,061 cases, while vehicle thefts declined from 35,805 to 33,060 ([CNN Brasil, 2025](#)). Subsequently, data through January–November 2025 showed that while robberies totaled 91,008 incidents and declined by 13.5%, thefts increased by 2.4%; excluding vehicles, other thefts grew by 4.2%, rising from 221,057 to 230,050 cases ([Poder360, 2025](#)).

The increase in this type of crime is not evenly distributed across the urban territory. Districts with a high concentration of commercial, administrative, and mobility-related activities record above average increases. The central region, particularly the Sé administrative district, showed significant growth in robbery and theft incidence, with high daily counts associated with intense pedestrian circulation. Similar patterns, albeit on a smaller scale, were observed in areas such as Pinheiros, Tatuapé, and Campo Belo, where everyday exposure and perceptions of insecurity exceed indicators of serious violence.

3.2 Homicides

The city of São Paulo recorded an increase in homicides in 2025, bringing to an end a sustained improvement trend over the previous four years. Cases rose from 481 in 2024 to 501 in 2025, representing an increase of 4.15%. By contrast, the state of São Paulo recorded 2,517 homicides in 2024 and 2,438 in 2025, a reduction of 3.13%. Additionally, the number of homicide victims in the capital also increased, reaching 530 people in 2025—a 6% rise compared to 2024, when 498 victims were recorded. These figures are part of the annual balance released by the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), consolidating municipal and state crime indicators for the period from January to December ([Globo, 2026](#)). The uptick in the capital interrupts a downward trajectory that began in 2021, when São Paulo recorded 561 intentional homicides. The figure declined slightly to 560 in 2022, fell more sharply in 2023 to 481, remained stable in 2024, and then increased in 2025.

One of the most recurrent mechanisms in homicides recorded in São Paulo is the use of firearms, frequently associated with criminal activities, gang conflicts, and episodes of interpersonal violence. This phenomenon is closely linked to disputes between criminal organizations over territorial control, particularly for the exploitation of illegal economies such as drug trafficking and extortion. These dynamics are more intensely concentrated in favelas and peripheral neighborhoods of the metropolitan area, where effective state presence and control tend to be more limited, or where territorial dominance by the PCC prevails.

3.3 Extortion, threats and kidnapping

In the city of São Paulo, the recent configuration of risk associated with kidnapping and extortion shows greater visibility of short-duration, highly coercive modalities aimed at the immediate extraction of resources. The most prominent of these is the “express kidnapping,” understood as the temporary detention of the victim to force cash withdrawals, transfers, or the unlocking of banking applications—especially via PIX. According to reports released in early 2026, this modality registered a 40% increase in 2025 in São Paulo, prompting renewed concern among authorities due to its rapid execution, high profitability, and ability to combine deprivation of liberty with immediate extortion ([Band, 2026](#)). In parallel, reports also indicated that extortion-through-kidnapping cases reached 128 incidents in 2025, highlighting the persistence of more structured criminal schemes distinct from purely opportunistic events and more closely aligned with specialized coercive and revenue-extraction logics ([Jovem Pan News, 2026](#)). Taken together, these trends suggest that in the city of São Paulo the risk associated with these crimes depends not only on their volume, but on the consolidation of modalities that combine intimidation, temporary control of the victim, and immediate economic pressure.

Complementarily, between June 12 and July 2, 2025, a wave of vandalism targeted the public transportation system, with at least 235 buses attacked within the city of São Paulo alone. In most cases, vehicles were stoned, resulting in shattered windows and, in more severe incidents, injuries to passengers, including a reported nasal fracture in the southern zone of the capital. Similar incidents spread to the São Paulo Metropolitan Region and coastal municipalities, raising the total number of events to more than 280 in a short period. Investigations conducted by the Civil Police have considered possible retaliation by criminal groups or reactions to the installation of video-surveillance systems in transport units as potential hypotheses, although no single, definitive motivation has so far been confirmed ([EL TIEMPO, 2025](#)).

4. Risk generating actors and factors

4.1 Criminal Organizations

The main criminal gangs operating in São Paulo and its metropolitan area are the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)—the dominant organization, with more than 40,000 active members originating in São Paulo’s prison system—and the Comando Vermelho (CV), its largest rival, with approximately 30,000 members seeking territorial expansion. Both structures exercise dominance through territorial control via *bocas de fumo* (drug retail points), extortion, and selective violence, with a prevailing focus on street-level drug trafficking. The PCC controls favelas in central São Paulo, particularly in the Sé sub-prefecture, which is used as a headquarters for trafficking, money laundering, and extortion activities. It also controls areas such as Jardim Tremembé, Vila Maria, Vila Guilherme, and Casa Verde, enforcing internal rules such as prohibiting street robberies and operating through coordinated prison-based command structures to organize activities and avoid attracting law-enforcement attention. As a result, the most prevalent crimes within this criminal structure include wholesale drug trafficking—facilitated by the infiltration of approximately 90% of São Paulo’s prisons—cargo theft, bank robberies, money laundering—notably through adulterated fuel schemes, through which an estimated BRL 52 billion have been laundered—and kidnappings. The organization also employs social media networks to promote the group and reinforce its presence ([Globo, 2026](#) ; [EL PAÍS, 2026](#)).

Regarding the Comando Vermelho, it has an emerging presence in 23 cities across the State of São Paulo, particularly along the northern coast—such as Ubatuba, the Vale do Paraíba, Bananal, and Rio Claro—although its footprint in the capital remains limited. Nonetheless, it has infiltrated peripheral neighborhoods without dominant favelas, replicating a model used in Rio de Janeiro. Within this framework, the group’s predominant criminal activities include street-level drug trafficking, extortion, money laundering, banking fraud—amounting to approximately BRL 136 million—and contract killings or homicides linked mainly to territorial disputes, particularly in Rio Claro, where the group employs direct violence and technology to expand territorial control ([Globo, 2026](#)).

Finally, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump accelerated procedures to designate the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). According to U.S. government sources cited by Brazilian media, the State Department has finalized the technical documentation supporting the designation, and the decision is now pending political approval. This move triggered an urgent diplomatic crisis between

Brasília and Washington. Designation as an FTO criminalizes material support to the organization, enables the freezing of assets, and opens the possibility of unilateral extraterritorial military operations ([Infobae, 2026](#)).

4.2 Microtrafficking

One of the most complex areas in the city are “Cracolândias,” located in central São Paulo. From a corporate perspective, the primary risk does not lie in the isolated existence of the phenomenon, but rather in its capacity to reemerge, fragment, and impact key operational environments with little advance warning. São Paulo does not have a single “Cracolândia,” but multiple open-air drug-use scenes whose locations vary over time as a result of police dispersion and control operations. Academic research and official monitoring have identified dozens of simultaneously active hotspots, particularly in the central area and its immediate surroundings, with the capacity to shift into other neighborhoods. Consequently, Cracolândias must be analyzed as a mobile dynamic rather than a fixed geographic point ([Oglobo, 2025](#)).

Historically, the phenomenon has been concentrated in the districts of Luz, Campos Elíseos, Santa Ifigênia, República, and Santa Cecília, including streets such as Helvétia, Dino Bueno, Alameda Cleveland, Rua dos Protestantes, and Princesa Isabel Square ([Jornal da USP, 2024](#)). Although in May 2025 the state government announced the dismantling of the fixed “flow” on Rua dos Protestantes, multiple sources confirm that drug use and sales did not disappear; instead, they fragmented into smaller, mobile clusters on adjacent streets and nearby zones. After these operations, intermittent concentrations were observed in areas such as Barra Funda (around the Memorial da América Latina) and Favela do Moinho (Campos Elíseos). These areas function as temporary regrouping spaces, with lower density than the historical flows but with direct local impacts on security and public order ([Meiahora, 2025](#)).

4.3 Social protests and blockades

Throughout 2025, São Paulo was a recurring stage for social protests with direct impacts on urban mobility, preventive security, and economic activity. In March and October, demonstrations against police violence took place in the city center and on Avenida Paulista, organized by anti-racism and human-rights groups. Although these protests were largely peaceful, they resulted in partial closures of strategic roadways and the activation of special security measures, highlighting the need for preventive public-order management in high-traffic areas.

In May 2025, housing-rights protests marked a critical inflection point. Communities facing eviction—such as Favela do Moinho and the Areião and Jorge Hereda occupations—blocked segments of the Marginal Pinheiros, Avenida Aricanduva, and CPTM rail lines, affecting hundreds of thousands of public-transport users. These events demonstrated how legitimate social demands can generate significant friction with urban mobility and economic activity, while also reinforcing long-standing distrust between peripheral populations and security forces, thereby increasing the risk of conflict escalation ([EL PAÍS, 2025](#)). Toward the end of the year, social conflict took on a systemic dimension. In December 2025, a mass strike by bus drivers over labor grievances affected more than 3.3 million people in a single day, triggering record levels of congestion—exceeding 1,400 km of traffic—and the temporary suspension of vehicle circulation schemes, with direct impacts on urban productivity ([Agenda Do Poder, 2025](#)).

In parallel, São Paulo consolidated its role as a central stage for nationwide political protests, particularly surrounding the trial and conviction of former President Jair Bolsonaro and the debate over a potential amnesty. In September and December 2025, tens of thousands of demonstrators occupied Avenida Paulista in rallies both supporting and opposing the former president, turning the avenue into a symbolic space of democratic contestation. These mobilizations disrupted traffic and commercial activity and required special security plans aimed at preventing confrontations between ideologically opposed groups ([EL MUNDO, 2025](#)).

In the first quarter of 2026, social protest retained its capacity for urban disruption, albeit with lower levels of generalized violence. A representative example was the mobilization of motorcycle couriers and app-based delivery workers in March 2026, who blocked key thoroughfares such as the Marginal Pinheiros and Avenida Paulista to demand improved labor conditions and oppose new regulations—confirming the persistence of road blockades as a tool of social pressure ([Globo, 2026](#)).

5. Impact of Crime

Political

Currently, the PCC operates as a criminal-corporate conglomerate, having driven a transformation of organized crime in the country and consolidated itself as an actor capable of infiltrating strategic sectors such as fuel distribution, transportation, the financial market, logistics, and fintech. This has directly affected economic governance and fair business

competition within legal frameworks. In parallel, the growing presence of the Comando Vermelho in cities across the State of São Paulo has generated territorial disputes that increase localized violence and uncertainty regarding the regulatory environment for companies operating along logistics corridors and within industrial zones both inside and outside the city of São Paulo.

In response, during 2025 the state deployed the largest coordinated offensive in its history against the PCC, involving the Federal Police, the Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal), and public prosecutors' offices, with a focus on dismantling the financial and business structures of organized crime. While these actions reinforce a strong political signal, they do not eliminate residual risk for the private sector, particularly in the short term, due to the continued infiltration of members of these organizations into formal systems.

Economic

The most critical economic impact is concentrated in cargo theft, as São Paulo records the highest incidence of this high-impact crime in the country. Approximately 43–46% of all cargo thefts in Brazil occur in the State of São Paulo, generating annual losses exceeding BRL 1.2 billion, with direct effects on logistics costs, insurance premiums, and final prices—for both companies and consumers. Additionally, PCC-linked groups employ extortionate kidnapping of drivers, vehicle theft, and *fleteo* (armed follow-and-rob robbery) as part of systematic criminal operations, disrupting urban and regional supply chains. As in the political dimension, criminal infiltration into formal sectors generates unfair competition, distorts markets, and exposes companies to reputational and compliance risks, even in the absence of voluntary involvement.

The highest levels of impact are observed in the retail, logistics, energy, agribusiness, and transportation sectors. Public-security specialists have noted that, although the most prevalent crimes in São Paulo do not always involve direct violence, their impact is substantial due to economic losses, repeated victimization, and their direct influence on public perceptions of insecurity—a determining factor in the evaluation of the city's operational and reputational risk.

Social

The most visible social impacts of organized crime expansion stem from the reinforcement of environments in which criminal behavior becomes normalized, leading to increased

indirect extortion, threats, express kidnapping, and crimes targeting executives, transport personnel, and key staff. At the same time, this produces a cycle in which fear of crime affects labor mobility, undermines talent retention, and impacts corporate well-being—particularly among expatriates and mid-level operational management. While increased targeted police presence and urban surveillance have produced visible improvements in central areas, crime has also been displaced toward peripheral zones and logistics corridors, especially those that are not primary tourist centers.

Technological

The PCC and associated criminal networks leverage digital payment systems, informal logistics platforms, and even unregulated fintechs for money laundering, digital extortion, and virtual kidnapping. As a result, companies lacking technological traceability, fleet monitoring, or predictive intelligence face heightened exposure to cargo theft and *fleteo* by these organizations. Consequently, technology has become a critical risk-mitigation factor, rather than an optional one. On the State side, the expansion of financial intelligence capabilities, data analytics, and inter-agency cooperation has formed the core of the response, enabling faster adaptation to the technological evolution of criminal organizations.

6. Recommendations

- Avoid travel during nighttime hours or periods of low activity, especially in sub-prefectures with high crime incidence or known criminal-actor presence, such as Cidade Tiradentes, Perus, and Grajaú, among others identified in the risk map.
- For recurring travel, vary routes and schedules to reduce predictable patterns.
- Always maintain a high level of situational awareness, paying close attention to your immediate surroundings, changes in others' behavior, and unusual situations in the areas you transit.
- Prior to travel, identify sub-prefectures classified as High Risk under this analysis to avoid them or, where strictly necessary, implement additional security and self-protection measures.
- If using a private or corporate vehicle, conduct a prior route analysis, considering alternative roads, lower-exposure time windows, and known critical points that may generate delays or vulnerabilities.

- In areas with high concentrations of people—such as restaurants, shopping centers, bars, or corporate events—maintain constant control of personal belongings.
- Avoid engaging with strangers who request favors, information, or approach suddenly, as these dynamics are often used as distraction mechanisms for opportunistic theft.
- Avoid storing sensitive or detailed information on your mobile phone related to your family, executive schedule, or the organization you work for.
- Exercise particular caution regarding information shared on social media. Lower privacy settings increase exposure of personal, professional, and family data, which can be exploited for extortion, social engineering, or virtual kidnapping.
- When possible, receive training in defensive and evasive driving to enhance reaction capacity in public-space risk situations.
- In situations of high vulnerability—such as attempted robbery, *fleteo*, or express kidnapping—do not resist. Prioritize the preservation of your physical integrity and that of your family.
- For expatriate executives or foreign staff, consider implementing remote movement-monitoring systems, coordinated from a Command Center or control room, to enable tracking, early response, and support in the event of incidents.
- Ensure that personnel have clearly defined and up-to-date emergency communication channels.

References and bibliography

DW. (2025). Comando Vermelho y otros: el crimen organizado en Brasil. *dw.com*. <https://www.dw.com/es/de-comando-vermelho-a-primeiro-comando-da-capital-c%C3%B3mo-opera-el-crimen-organizado-en-brasil/a-74562415>

EL PAÍS. (2025). El Comando Vermelho, un grupo carioca volcado en el narco con 30.000 hombres y en expansión. *El País América*. <https://elpais.com/america/2025-10-30/el-comando-vermelho-un-grupo-carioca-volcado-en-el-narco-con-30000-hombres-y-en-expansion.html>

El Mundo. (2025). Los brasileños salen a la calle a manifestarse contra la ley de blindaje a políticos y la posible amnistía a Bolsonaro. *El Mundo*. <https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2025/09/21/68d04e8521efa0b7528b4573.html>

Globo. (2026). *Entregadores de aplicativos bloqueiam vias de SP em protesto contra curso obrigatório*. G1. <https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2026/03/25/entregadores-de-aplicativos-bloqueiam-vias-de-sp-em-protesto-por-melhores-taxas.ghtml>

Jornal da USP. (2024). *Blog*. Jornal Da USP. <https://jornal.usp.br/atualidades/a-cidade-de-sao-paulo-possui-72-cracolandias-e-nao-apenas-uma-no-centro-da-capital/>

Meia Hora. (2025). *Onde está a Cracolândia? Como está o jogo de gato e rato de polícia e tráfico no centro de SP*. Jornal Meia Hora. <https://www.meiahora.com.br/geral/2025/06/7069829-onde-esta-a-cracolandia-como-esta-o-jogo-de-gato-e-rato-de-policia-e-traffic-no-centro-de-sp.html>

Oglobo. (2025). *Seis meses após 'fim' da Cracolândia, moradores e comerciantes aprovam transformação, mas uso de drogas se espalha pelo Centro de SP*. O Globo. <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/sao-paulo/noticia/2025/11/13/com-fim-da-cracolandia-areas-de-uso-de-drogas-se-espalham-em-sao-paulo.ghtml>

Globo. (2025a). *PCC usava Favela do Moinho como «quartel-general» no Centro de SP para tráfico, lavagem e extorsão de moradores de até R\$ 100 mil*. G1. <https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2025/09/08/pcc-usava-favela-do-moinho-como-quartel-general-para-traffic-lavagem-e-extorsao-de-moradores-de-ate-r-100-mil.ghtml>

Globo. (2025b). *Segurança que agrediu e abandonou empresário desacordado está preso por homicídio doloso, diz SSP*. G1. <https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2025/10/27/seguranca-que-agrediu-e-abandonou-empresario-desacordado-esta-presos-por-homicidio-doloso-diz-ssp.ghtml>

Globo. (2025c). *Guerra de facções: território sem «dono» no tráfico, município de SP vira área de disputa do PCC com CV*. G1. <https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-carlos-regiao/noticia/2025/11/11/guerra-de-faccoes-territorio-sem-dono-no-trafico-municipio-de-sp-vira-area-de-disputa-do-pcc-com-cv.ghtml>

Globo. (2026a). *Disputa entre PCC e CV no interior de SP motivou chacina, execuções e corpos carbonizados, aponta investigação do Gaeco*. G1. <https://g1.globo.com/sp/piracicaba-regiao/noticia/2026/01/29/guerra-entre-pcc-e-cv-no-interior-de-sp-motivou-chacina-execucoes-e-corpos-carbonizados-aponta-investigacao-do-gaeco.ghtml>

Globo. (2026b). *Homicídios sobem na cidade de SP em 2025, e sequência de quedas é interrompida*. G1. <https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2026/01/30/homicidios-sobem-na-cidade-de-sp-em-2025-e-sequencia-de-quedas-e-interrompida.ghtml>

Infobae. (2026). *Brasil negocia con Estados Unidos el freno a la designación del PCC y el Comando Vermelho como organizaciones terroristas*. Infobae. <https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/03/11/brasil-negocia-con-estados-unidos-el-freno-a-la-designacion-del-pcc-y-el-comando-vermelho-como-organizaciones-terroristas/>

Interlira. (2025a). *INCIDENTES DE SEGURIDAD EN SÃO PAULO – BOLETÍN MENSUAL DE JULIO*. <https://interlira-reports.com/es/security/sao-paulo-security-incidents-july-monthly-bulletin-4/08/08/2025/>

Interlira. (2025). <https://interlira-reports.com/es/security/urban-violence-and-security-dilemmas-in-sao-paulo/08/08/2025/>

Interlira. (2025b). *VIOLENCIA URBANA Y DILEMAS DE SEGURIDAD EN SÃO PAULO*. <https://interlira-reports.com/es/security/urban-violence-and-security-dilemmas-in-sao-paulo/08/08/2025/>

Interlira. (2025c). *AUMENTAN LOS ROBOS SEGUIDOS DE ASESINATOS EN SÃO PAULO*. INTERLIRA. <https://interlira-reports.com/es/news/robberies-followed-by-murder-on-the-rise-in-sao-paulo/24/03/2025/>

Interlira. (2026). <https://interlira-reports.com/es/security/sao-paulo-security-incidents-2nd-bulletin-of-march-3/17/03/2026/>

Prefeitura de São Paulo. (2025). *São Paulo registra queda histórica nos índices de criminalidade no primeiro semestre de 2025*. <https://prefeitura.sp.gov.br/w/s%C3%A3o-paulo-registra-queda-hist%C3%B3rica-nos-%C3%ADndices-de-criminalidade-no-primeiro-semester-de-2025-1>

Band. (2026). *Sequestro-relâmpago cresce 40% em São Paulo e acende alerta das autoridades: Alta dos casos em 2025 reacende debate sobre penas mais duras e uso do PIX em crimes*. Band Rádio Bandeirantes. <https://www.band.com.br/radio-bandeirantes/noticias/sequestro-relampago-cresce-40-em-sao-paulo-e-acende-alerta-das-autoridades-202601090918>

Jovem Pan News. (2026). *SP tem 128 casos de extorsão mediante sequestro em 2025; Mehero e Kobayashi comentam* [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NN5VTQ0LYU>