



SECURITY OVERVIEW

Mexico City – México

Political Analysis and Corporate
Security Unit - UAPSC

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Security Overview

Ciudad de México, México

1. Situational Analysis

In 2025, Mexico faced a complex situation in terms of security and public order. This was particularly evident following the violent reconfiguration of the criminal landscape, ongoing institutional weakness, and legislative stagnation. Although there has been a significant increase in operations, weapons seizures, and drug confiscations at the national level, the focus of these interventions has been on Sinaloa, leaving aside areas such as Quintana Roo, Mexico City, and Chiapas, where crime is spreading without an appropriate response from the state. An example of this is the expansion of CJNG's presence to all regions of the country.

Since taking office in October 2024, Clara Brugada has advocated for maintaining comprehensive security measures in Mexico City (CDMX), based on addressing the causes of high-impact crimes, such as poverty and inequality; a model of police proximity; 360-degree vision through a technological platform to analyze reports geospatially; artificial intelligence, drones, and big data analysis. While this has brought quantitative improvements in terms of the number of high-impact crimes recorded, it has not translated into improvements in the perception of security among Mexicans, 63.8% of whom feel unsafe in the country's capital ([EL PAÍS, 2025](#)).


The most recent National Urban Public Safety Survey (ENSU), conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi) during the second half of 2025 and published in January 2026, shows that the municipalities with the highest perception of insecurity are Iztacalco, Azcapotzalco, Tláhuac, and Iztapalapa. The former has a perception of insecurity of 67.9%, an increase of 4.1% compared to September 2025. Azcapotzalco showed the largest increase compared to the last measurement (up 8.9%). Meanwhile, Tláhuac has a citizen perception of insecurity of 72.3%, the highest in this measurement for all Mexico City boroughs. Finally, Iztapalapa reduced its insecurity perception index by 2.9%, but still has a high index of 71.9%. In contrast, Benito Juárez has the lowest perception of insecurity, registering a rate of 14.8% and showing a decrease of 0.8% compared to September 2025 ([Inegi, 2026](#)).

In this document, the Political Analysis and Corporate Security Unit of 3+SC will carry out an Urban Security Assessment for Mexico City, analyzing the dynamics that affect security,

the factors that generate risk, strategies that influence crime trends, and criminal behavior based on statistics. The main objective is to raise awareness of the city's security situation in order to establish the impact of these crimes and security considerations that are useful for risk management, treatment, and control.

2. Risk Level

The risk level analysis aims to identify areas where, according to institutional statistics, there is a higher probability of violence and high-impact crimes occurring. In the case of this Urban Security Assessment for Mexico City, the characterization will be based on security and co-existence statistics from the National Urban Public Security Survey (ENSU) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Inegi), using two indicators: homicides and thefts from individuals.



Source: Prepared internally using data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (Inegi), 2025.

Medium Risk Level: Coyoacán, Cuajimalpa de Morelos, La Magdalena Contreras y Benito Juárez

The municipalities with this level of risk have a relative low incidence of high-impact crimes compared to the rest of the city. In addition, homicides and thefts against individuals have a lesser impact on these municipalities than on others. Likewise, the presence of criminal groups is moderate and, for the most part, there is control by the security forces, thus gener-

ating more isolated cases of insecurity. Even so, according to the National Urban Public Safety Survey, three of the four municipalities classified here show an upward trend in terms of perceived insecurity rates.

Medium-High Risk Level: Milpa Alta, Tlalpan y Miguel Hidalgo

The municipalities classified at this risk level have a moderately low perception of insecurity but a high incidence of street robbery and a growing presence of both the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco New Generation cartel, resulting in disputes between these violent organizations. Even so, the case of Tlalpan far exceeds the perception of insecurity in the other two municipalities, but with respect to September 2025, it improved by almost 10 percentage points. September 2025, it improved by almost 10 percentage points.

High Risk Level: Azcapotzalco, Gustavo A. Madero, Iztacalco, Álvaro Obregón, Xochimilco y Venustiano Carranza

The municipalities classified at this risk level have a large presence of criminal groups engaged in fierce competition over small-scale drug dealing and other illicit activities, which leads to a perception of rising insecurity, exceeding 60% in the vast majority of them of the perception of citizen insecurity. At the same time, these gangs increase the statistics for extortion, robbery of pedestrians, and theft in various forms, especially considering that they also subcontract smaller groups, generating greater criminal activity.

Very High Risk Level: Iztapalapa, Tláhuac y Cuauhtémoc

Iztapalapa and Tláhuac are among the boroughs with the highest perception of insecurity and the most significant decline since the last measurement. Cuauhtémoc, meanwhile, is currently the epicenter of street robbery, with rising rates of homicide and extortion. In all three boroughs, there is a strong presence of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), the Tláhuac Cartel, and the Tepito Union, as well as the Anti-Union Force in the case of Cuauhtémoc. These structures are fighting for dominance and expansion, generating lethal violence associated with these territorial disputes. There are also multiple hotspots for assault and homicide throughout these municipalities.

Finally, it should be noted that the municipalities of Milpa Alta, Cuajimalpa de Morelos, and Miguel Hidalgo are the only ones not affected by the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, an organization currently responsible for the greatest disturbance of public order in Mexico following the assassination of alias “El Mencho.” For this reason, it is expected that the munic-

ipalities with a presence of this cartel will increase their level of risk due to reprisals against the population and the State, as has been the case in multiple cities in more than 16 states in Mexico, but which have been met with a response from the authorities to mitigate these risks. A clear example of this is that the National Guard maintains a solid security deployment in Mexico City, protecting the facilities of the Special Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime (FEMDO) located on Paseo de la Reforma and the movement of a forensic ambulance from Mexico City International Airport (AICM). In addition, President Claudia Sheinbaum ordered the Mexico City Security and Peacebuilding Cabinet to collaborate with the Federal Security Cabinet authorities on preventive actions. Likewise, the capital's Secretariat of Citizen Security (SSC) has implemented a special operation, which includes patrols in crowded areas and entrances to Mexico City. ([Posta México, 2026](#)).

3. Crime trends and analysis

To highlight the percentage changes and dynamics by crime in Mexico City, a crime analysis will be provided below, showing the figures and trends in variation for ten high-impact crimes for two periods: the years 2023 vs. 2024 and the January-June period of the years 2024 vs. 2025.

CRIME STATISTICS IN MEXICO CITY	Year 2023	Year 2024	Variation % 2023 vs 2024	Year 2024	Year 2025	Variation % 2024 vs 2025
HOMICIDE	779	813	4%	813	755	-7%
THEFT FROM PERSONS	12880	11598	-10%	11598	11236	-3%
EXTORTION	496	473	-5%	473	1704	264%
KIDNAPPING	29	23	-21%	23	26	13%
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	3433	3236	-6%	3236	2592	-20%
CARJACKING	6153	6860	11%	6860	5907	-13%
RETAIL THEFT	1983	1842	-7%	1842	1689	-8%
LAND PIRACY	78	31	-60%	31	19	-39%
SEXUAL OFFENSES	793	854	8%	854	710	-17%
TOTAL	26624	25730	-3%	25730	24638	-4%

Source: Prepared internally using information from the Citizen Council for Security and Justice in Mexico City.

Note. This data is subject to change based on updates from the source.

During the period 2025–2026, Mexico City experienced complex changes in its security conditions. Although the *2025 Security Report*, presented on January 15, 2026, by Mayor Clara Brugada, highlighted a notable reduction in high-impact crimes, several recent reports showed that extortion and kidnapping continue to increase and represent a structural challenge for the authorities. The city ended 2025 with 57 high-impact crimes per day, the lowest figure since 2012, but the crime of threats fell by only 1.5%, accumulating 19,811 investigations that year, which shows that criminal intimidation continues to be a strong presence in several areas of the capital ([La Razón, 2026](#)). This problem is accentuated when considering the update to ENVIPE 2025, which specifies that underreporting reached 93.2% of crimes committed in 2024—that is, less than 7 out of every 100 incidents were reported and led to an investigation—meaning that official statistics may reflect only a fraction of the actual crime in the city. Differences in the propensity to report crimes also explain why higher-income municipalities such as Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo have higher crime rates per capita, with 358 and 291 per 10,000 inhabitants respectively, and why in areas such as Lomas de Chapultepec, property crimes such as fraud and breach of trust predominate, while in neighborhoods such as Del Valle and Nápoles, there continues to be a high incidence of threats and sexual crimes ([ENVIPE, 2025](#)).


Extortion is the phenomenon that showed the most alarming growth. During 2025, investigations into this crime increased by 260%, from 473 to 1,704 cases, a trend confirmed by the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System. That same year, the Secretariat of Citizen Security arrested 272 people for extortion or attempted extortion, 33% more than in 2024, while several recent cases illustrate the persistence and sophistication of the crime. In the Historic Center, a repeat offender was arrested for depriving a victim of her liberty to force her to empty her bank accounts, as part of a criminal cell active in the Cuauhtémoc municipality. and on December 28, 2025, three individuals were arrested in Iztapalapa for aggravated extortion as part of reinforced operations in commercial areas. The economic dimension of the problem was also evident when the Canaco CDMX reported that protection rackets generated losses of more than 84.7 million pesos in the first quarter of 2025 alone, seriously affecting small businesses and increasing criminal pressure on high-traffic commercial corridors ([Periódico Enfoque, 2026](#)). In addition, in December 2025, the federal government published the National Strategy against Extortion, aimed at curbing protection rackets and standardizing state laws through reforms and new operational guidelines for local prosecutors, a formal recognition of the sustained increase in this crime towards 2026.

At the same time, kidnapping also showed an upward trend. Investigation files increased from 23 in 2024 to 26 in 2025, a 13% increase according to official figures. Between January and October 2025, cases grew by 66.6%, from 15 to 25 incidents, and specialized organizations such as México Evalúa ranked Mexico City among the entities with the highest kidnapping rates in the country in 2025, with an annual increase of 300.9%, particularly in areas with criminal groups involved in territorial disputes. Recent events confirm this trend: in September 2025, eight members of a criminal cell—including three capital city police officers—were arrested for express kidnapping and extortion in Cuauhtémoc, Iztapalapa, and Ecatepec, revealing the infiltration of criminal structures into police forces ([Financiero, 2025](#)). Similarly, in December 2025, the organization Alto al Secuestro (Stop Kidnapping) reported a monthly increase of 3.9% in kidnapping cases and warned that the authorities could be leaving out up to 63% of the victims detected by public and media monitoring, highlighting the magnitude of underreporting of this crime ([Tribuna de México, 2025](#)).

Overall, these findings show that, although Mexico City has made significant progress in reducing certain serious crimes, extortion and kidnapping continue to rise and represent the main challenges for urban security in 2025–2026, especially in areas of intense commercial activity and neighborhoods where expanding criminal cells operate.

4. Risk generating actors and factors

Top crime generators in Mexico City in 2025



Source: Prepared internally using data from the DEA and MILENIO, 2025.

According to data from the Secretariat of Citizen Security and the Mexico City Police, at least one criminal structure operates in each of Mexico City's boroughs. This data is relevant because it confirms that the criminal environment in the capital does not respond to a dynamic of open confrontation between large cartels, but rather to a fragmented urban scheme where different cells and organizations operate simultaneously, with differentiated impacts on public safety and the business environment ([MILENIO, 2025](#)).

For risk analysis purposes, the criminal landscape in Mexico City can be grouped into three operational factors that concentrate the main risk-generating actors.

The first is the capture of urban and commercial economies through drug dealing and extortion. In this area, local structures with strong territorial roots operate, such as La Unión Tepito and its splinter groups, which have consolidated “protection rackets” as a constant source of criminal financing in areas of high economic activity. These dynamics mainly affect formal and informal businesses, markets, nightlife establishments, and distribution chains, taking advantage of the high circulation of cash and commercial density in central municipalities.

The second factor corresponds to the use of the capital as a logistical and financial platform by national organizations, including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel. Their presence is not necessarily manifested in visible territorial control, but rather in low-profile operations associated with distribution, interregional coordination, and possible money laundering schemes. At this level, the risk is related to infiltration of commercial chains, indirect pressure on suppliers, and the use of business structures for illicit purposes.

The third factor is criminal diversification and adaptation, where emerging local cells and organizations with less operational capacity—including groups associated with La Familia Michoacana, the Tláhuac Cartel, and El Tren de Aragua—converge to participate in activities such as express kidnapping, digital fraud, trafficking, and micro-extortion. These structures reflect a trend toward less visible forms of crime, but with a growing impact on perceptions of insecurity and economic impact.

Under this scheme, the most recurrent crimes—drug dealing, robbery, targeted homicide, and, especially, extortion—are part of a logic of sustained extraction of illicit income rather than widespread armed disputes.

The local government of Clara Brugada has implemented a coordinated strategy with the Attorney General's Office and the National Guard that has reduced high-impact crimes by around 60–61%

compared to 2019, with an emphasis on monitoring, intelligence, and targeted operations by quadrants, as well as community evaluation of police performance. Between 2019 and 2025, there has been a reported decrease of nearly 60% in high-impact crimes and around 50% in homicides, and in 2025, the quadrants were expanded from 847 to 1,011 to reinforce 24/7 territorial presence (three chiefs per quadrant and six officers per shift) ([Guillermo Ortega, 2025](#)).

The central government maintains a comprehensive approach to pacification and strengthening intelligence and the National Guard; however, in Mexico City, priority is given to community policing and inter-institutional coordination (rather than direct militarization), supported by technology such as Visión/Visor 360, which integrates real-time reporting, crime georeferencing, and video surveillance, with the goal of expanding to 150,000 cameras and deploying drones to anticipate and neutralize urban cells without escalating open confrontations. At the same time, legal measures against extortion have been tightened, with national standardization of the criminal offense and aggravated penalties for “protection money.” However, on the economic front, “protection money” generated losses of 84.7 million pesos in the first quarter of 2025 alone, according to Canaco, which keeps pressure on MSMEs and supply chains despite the reduction in homicides ([Excelsior, 2025](#)).

Faced with institutional pressure, criminal groups have adapted their methods to less visible forms—telephone and cyber extortion, financial coercion, and digital fraud—reducing their direct exposure. This explains the resurgence of extortion and its consolidation as the main source of urban criminal income, even in the context of reduced lethal violence.

In terms of perception, despite the decline in high-impact crimes, INEGI's ENSU reported insecurity levels above 63% in 2025, reflecting a gap between statistical improvement and the social climate. In this context, the 2025–2026 strategy combines territorialization, digital intelligence, police professionalization, and metropolitan coordination with the State of Mexico to contain illicit income, prevent territorial control, and sustain the downward trend in high-impact crimes.

In short, although government strategies show measurable progress, the criminal environment in Mexico City remains highly adaptable in terms of technology and finance. The main challenge for 2026 is not to contain a war between cartels, but to dismantle extortion structures, reduce economic pressure on the productive sector, and close the gap between perception and data through preventive intelligence and targeted control.

5. Impact of Crime

This report presents a detailed analysis of the security and human development outlook in Mexico City (CDMX) for the year 2025, considering the impact of crimes such as homicide, terrorism, kidnapping, threats, and extortion on public and international perception.

Political

Public security in Mexico faces structural challenges such as the weakness of state and municipal police forces, collusion between authorities and organized crime, and a reduction in the budget of the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (SSPC) by more than 36% by 2025, making it difficult to implement effective anti-crime strategies. The government's strategy has abandoned the policy of “hugs, not bullets,” increasing the Armed Forces' freedom of action to carry out operations against criminal leaders, which could trigger violent clashes and internal fractures among criminal groups. In Mexico City, the local legal framework promotes citizen security based on respect for human rights, focusing on rights and guarantees for peaceful coexistence ([El Herald de México, 2025](#)).

Economic

Insecurity has a considerable negative impact on the economy, especially for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), on transportation routes with high criminal activity that affect mobility and commerce. The perception of insecurity inhibits investment and economic growth. This is linked to a deterioration in public finances with budget cuts in security, health, and other key sectors for human development. Finally, fiscal and regulatory reforms, along with political uncertainty, affect the business climate.

Social

The homicide rate in Mexico City has decreased, with femicide indicators also on the decline, but high-impact crimes such as robbery with violence, threats, and extortion persist. This explains why the perception of insecurity remains high among the population, with levels that affect social well-being and limit peaceful coexistence. The incidence of disappearances remains, mainly involving adult men and girls among missing children.

Technological

The security strategy includes investments in technology to monitor organized crime, although budgetary constraints hinder its optimal deployment. Technical and operational mechanisms are promoted to strengthen investigation, intelligence, and inter-institutional

coordination. It is also necessary to mention that technological development is key to improving police response times and effectiveness in case resolution.

6. Recommendations

- Keep constant awareness of your surroundings. Try to observe what is happening around you to anticipate potential risks or unusual behavior in the areas you travel through.
- Plan your vehicle routes carefully. Before traveling by car, review the route in advance and identify alternatives that allow you to react to roadblocks, incidents, or unexpected changes in the journey.
- Avoid nighttime travel in high-risk areas. Do not walk or drive late at night in neighborhoods or districts with a history of robberies, violent crimes, or significant gang activity.
- Consider remote tracking systems for foreign visitors. For expatriates or international staff, consider implementing movement monitoring tools from a Command Center to strengthen supervision and incident response.
- Keep control of your belongings in crowded places. In restaurants, shopping centers, bars, or other high-traffic areas, stay alert to your personal items and be cautious of people who approach unexpectedly to ask for favors or start a conversation.
- Protect sensitive information on your phone. Avoid storing personal, family, or work-related data that could compromise your safety in case of theft or loss of the device. Use social media cautiously.
- Limit the public information about your personal, work, or family life, as low privacy settings can facilitate extortion or kidnapping attempts.
- If you receive an extortion call, stay calm. Do not provide personal information; try to record details of the call and, if possible, record the audio to support a later report.
- In the face of direct threats, do not comply with the aggressor's demands and seek institutional support without delay.

- Strengthen your self-protection skills. If possible, train in defensive and evasive driving techniques that can help you respond appropriately during a street assault attempt.
- In high-risk situations, prioritize your safety. If you encounter a robbery, “express robbery,” or carjacking, avoid resisting; your personal safety is the most important.

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