

SECURITY OVERVIEW



Bogotá - Colombia

Political Analysis and Corporate
Security Unit - UAPSC

March 18th, 2026.


1. Executive Summary

Bogotá closed 2025 and began 2026 with a reduction in eleven of the thirteen high-impact crimes; however, there was a significant increase to historic levels in the perception of insecurity, according to the analysis presented by *Bogotá Cómo Vamos* (BCV). The *2025 Citizen Perception Survey* conducted by Bogotá Cómo Vamos indicated that 62% of Bogotá residents perceived the city as unsafe—the highest level in 17 years—despite improvements in certain areas. At the beginning of 2026, BCV reported that 63% of people feel unsafe in the city (although with a better perception at the neighborhood level). This highlights a contrast between the city's crime trends and the warning signs related to civic coexistence. In recent years, the capital has become a strategic epicenter of organized crime, where criminal and armed groups violently clash over territorial control. This conflict has driven an alarming increase in contract killings, turning it into an increasingly frequent phenomenon.

In this document, the Political Analysis and Corporate Security Unit (UAPSC) of 3+SC will conduct the Urban Security Assessment – Bogotá 2026, analyzing the dynamics that impact security, the risk-generating factors, and criminal behavior based on statistical data. The main objective is to present the city's security situation, providing information that will be useful for risk control and mitigation.

2. Risk Assessment

The purpose of the risk level analysis is to identify the localities where, according to institutional statistics, there is a higher probability that violent conditions exist and that high-impact crimes may materialize. The rating for the current Urban Security Assessment – Bogotá 2026 will be conducted using official figures from the District Secretariat of Security, as well as a graphical model developed by the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce (District Secretariat of Security and Coexistence, 2026), covering the period between January and March 2026. Information provided by Councilman Julián Espinosa in his 2025 annual management report will also be considered.



Source: Prepared by the authors.

Medium Risk Level: Engativá, Chapinero, Barrios Unidos, Mártires, Antonio Nariño, Candelaria.

In localities classified as medium risk, the overall trend suggests a comparatively lower materialization of high-impact crimes compared to the rest of the city, with a predominance of situational dynamics. These include urban centers, commercial corridors, tourism or night-life areas, and high mobility, all of which increase the “opportunity factor” for theft and occasional victimization. Although such areas may experience episodes of insecurity and localized hotspots, criminal behavior tends to be more dispersed and less persistent, with limited evidence of sustained territorial control by violent structures. Consequently, the risk is explained more by environmental conditions (pedestrian flows, commercial activity, and

connectivity) than by ongoing criminal disputes, and it is generally more responsive to situational prevention measures, targeted presence, and timely reporting.

Medium-High Risk Level: Suba, Usaquén, Fontibón, Rafael Uribe, Santa Fe, San Cristóbal, Teusaquillo, Puente Aranda, Tunjuelito, Usme y Bosa.

In medium-high risk areas, there is a trend toward greater recurrence and concentration of high-impact crimes, particularly high-frequency theft (against persons, residences, motorcycles, and vehicles), as well as coercive offenses such as threats or extortion in specific zones. These localities typically combine two layers: (i) opportunity driven by density, mobility, commercial or industrial corridors, or nightlife areas; and (ii) a more sustained presence of structures that exploit illegal economies and generate localized disputes. As a result, insecurity tends to be more constant than in medium-risk areas, with recurring “hot spots,” and requires a response that integrates territorial control, intelligence-led policing, interventions along the crime chain (fencing/auto parts markets), and preventive measures focused on critical locations and timeframes.

High Risk Level: Ciudad Bolívar y Kennedy.

High-risk localities exhibit a pattern in which the probability of violent conditions is higher due to the convergence of high-impact crimes, with a particular emphasis on lethal violence and dynamics associated with disputes over illicit revenues. Rather than isolated incidents, these areas display a scenario of territorial persistence, where the presence of organized crime and organized common delinquency tends to stabilize illegal markets (drug micro-trafficking, extortion, coercion) and to fuel both the materialization of crime and the perception of insecurity. Consequently, even when some general indicators may fluctuate, the risk remains elevated due to the combination of crime volume, violence, and criminal control over neighborhood spaces. This context demands comprehensive interventions, including focused deterrence, criminal investigation, control of illegal economies, and the strengthening of institutional and community capacities.

3. Crime Trends and analysis

To clearly visualize percentage changes and criminal dynamics in the city of Bogotá, the following section presents a crime analysis based on figures for 13 high-impact crimes, comparing the periods 2023 vs. 2024 and 2024 vs. 2025. This analysis is conducted using statistics issued by the National Police. Subsequently, a case-by-case analysis will be carried out, along with an examination of the scenarios and geographic areas in which these crimes materialize.

CRIME STATISTICS IN BOGOTA	Year 2023	Year 2024	Variation (%) 2023 vs 2024	Year 2024	Year 2025	Variation (%) 2024 vs 2025
HOMICIDES	1.069	1.206	13%	1.206	1.173	-3%
THEFT FROM PERSONS	147.321	129.440	-12%	129.440	123.364	-5%
EXTORTION	1.518	2.497	64%	2.497	2.106	-16%
KIDNAPPING	13	13	0%	13	40	208%
TERRORISM	0	0	0%	0	0	0%
THREATS	9.751	9.436	-3%	9.436	12.006	27%
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	7.302	6.028	-17%	6.028	5.976	-1%
CARJACKING	3.856	4.071	6%	4.071	3.246	-20%
MOTORCYCLE THEFT	4.790	5.237	9%	5.237	4.708	-10%
COMMERCIAL THEFT	8.617	10.240	19%	10.240	7.652	-25%
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ROBBERY	16	7	-56%	7	4	-43%
CARGO THEFT	18	19	6%	19	17	-11%
SEXUAL OFFENSES	6.782	9.668	43%	9.668	8.861	-8%
GRAND TOTAL	191.053	177.862	-7%	177.862	169.153	-5%

Source: Prepared by the authors using data from National Police.

Note: Figures are subject to change based on source update processes.

During 2025, a 5% decrease in reported crimes was observed compared to 2024, with increases recorded in two of the 13 crimes analyzed. The criminal dynamic with the highest percentage increase during this period was kidnapping, which rose by 208%, from 13 to 40 cases. This was followed by threats, which increased by 27%, from 9,436 to 12,006 cases. The crime with the highest number of reports in 2025 was theft against people, with 123,364 recorded incidents, compared to 129,440 in 2024. Additionally, there was a significant 25% decrease in commercial theft, dropping from 10,240 cases in 2024 to 7,652 cases in 2025. Overall, a decline was recorded across all forms of theft citywide in Bogotá, reflecting the efforts of the mayor's office to combat these criminal modalities ([El nuevo Siglo](#), 2026).

3.1 Theft from persons

In 2025, 123,364 cases of theft against persons were recorded in Bogotá, representing a 5% decrease compared to 2024. Likewise, between 2023 and 2024, a downward trend of 12% was observed, with cases declining from 147,321 to 129,440. Of the total number of reported thefts against persons registered in Bogotá in 2025, 85,218 were committed without the use of weapons, 20,749 involved bladed or sharp weapons, and 9,638 involved firearms.

According to the results of the 2025 Perception and Victimization Survey presented by the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, the reduction in theft against persons has contributed to a slight improvement in the perception of security, reflected in a decrease in the victimization rate and an increase in the number of citizens who consider their neighborhood to be safe. Nevertheless, this offense continues to be the crime with the greatest day-to-day impact and remains one of the main determinants of the perception of insecurity in the city ([Alcaldía de Bogotá, 2026](#)).


3.2 Homicide

In the 2024 vs. 2025 comparison, a 3% decrease was recorded, with cases declining from 1,206 in 2024 to 1,173 in 2025. This contrasts with the 2023 vs. 2024 period, which showed a 13% increase, rising from 1,069 to 1,206 cases. In 2025, the use of firearms predominated (730 cases), followed by bladed or sharp weapons (353), blunt objects (84), and explosive devices (6), confirming a pattern of high lethality and, in part, dynamics associated with organized criminal activity. Within this context, toward the close of the third quarter, a significant monthly inflection point was observed: September 2025 closed with 81 homicides, compared to 129 in September 2024 (a reduction of 48 cases). This was presented as the least violent September when compared with previous administrations, despite the fact that the city remained far from achieving the publicly stated goal of reducing the homicide rate to single digits by 2027 ([El Tiempo, 2025](#)).

According to the official explanation, part of this improvement is associated with increased operational pressure and territorial targeting, reflected in homicide-related arrests concentrated in Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy, San Cristóbal, Suba, and Bosa, as well as strategies of permanent presence in prioritized locations ([El Tiempo, 2025](#)). Nevertheless, this trend calls for caution: September is typically a critical month due to alcohol consumption and intolerance, and risks are projected for October–December, meaning that a favorable monthly result does not necessarily anticipate a sustained reduction in the annual cumulative figures. Furthermore, the composition of homicide in Bogotá suggests that, alongside cases associated with interpersonal disputes, a more structural layer linked to contract killings (sicariato) and networks with planning capacity persists, increasing the need for specialized criminal investigation. In this regard—and without using them as evidence of 2025 trends, but rather as an illustration of the evolution of the modus operandi—

subsequent incidents have been reported showing signs of high-level planning and pressure on the surrounding environment. These include contract killings in exclusive neighborhoods (such as *La Cabrera*), with alleged intimidation aimed at preventing the release of video footage and “erasing traces” ([Infobae](#), 2025), as well as long-range attacks in residential complexes that point to sophisticated operational patterns and possible links to criminal economies ([Infobae](#), 2025). Taken together, these elements reinforce that the underlying challenge lies in strengthening criminal investigation and the dismantling of criminal networks, in addition to territorial control and preventive interventions focused on civic coexistence.

Homicides in Bogota by locality 2024 vs 2025



Source: Prepared by the authors, 2026.


3.3 Extortion

In 2025, a 16% decrease was recorded in this criminal practice, with reported cases declining from 2,497 in 2024 to 2,106 in 2025. According to figures from the National Police, of the total reports filed in 2025, 895 were made via telephone calls, 601 through social media, and 351 involved no use of weapons. Consistent with this reduction, the 2025 trend suggests that extortion in Bogotá is shifting toward low-contact, high-scale modalities, where the interaction channel—rather than physical confrontation—acts as the primary enabler of the crime. This is reflected in the fact that a significant share of reports originated through phone calls and social media, and that a substantial proportion of cases occurred without the use of weapons, aligning with schemes based on psychological pressure, impersonation, and deception ([Alcaldía de Bogotá](#), 2026).

In parallel, two complementary dynamics are observed. On the one hand, digital extortion involving fake profiles, “false delivery” schemes, and the impersonation of authorities to demand payments ([Agencia de](#)

[Periodismo Investigativo](#), 2025); On the other hand, there are extortion schemes linked to local economies (commerce and informal transport) and related crimes such as charging for the return of stolen vehicles, where financial demands are accompanied by threats and, in some cases, by the impersonation of high-profile criminal organizations to increase intimidation ([El Tiempo](#), 2025; [Caracol Radio](#), 2025). Taken together, the trend suggests that the decline in reported cases coexists with a crime that is adapting to the digital environment, requiring a sustained response based on timely reporting, dismantling of criminal structures, and prevention focused on the most frequently used channels ([Alcaldía de Bogotá](#), 2026).

Extortions in Bogotá by locality 2024 vs 2025



Source: Prepared by the authors, 2026.

3.4 Threats

In 2025, 12,006 reports of threats were recorded, representing a 27% increase compared to 2024. In contrast, between 2023 and 2024, a slight 3% decrease was observed, with cases declining from 9,751 to 9,436. During 2025, 11,895 threats were carried out without the use of weapons, 43 involved firearms, 36 involved blunt objects, and 36 involved bladed or sharp weapons.

Consistent with this increase, the 2025 pattern suggests that threats primarily operate as a low-contact mechanism of intimidation and social control—aligned with the fact that nearly all reports involved no use of weapons—aimed more at generating fear and conditioning behavior than at direct physical aggression. Within this framework, the most recent public alerts (used here as a reference for the continuity of the phenomenon) illustrate how these dynamics can escalate into systematic pressure in specific territories, including the intimidation of leaders and political campaigns, the marking of building facades, and simultaneous impacts on political and commercial activity in areas with disputes between criminal structures. These dynamics sometimes include elements associated with extortion and demonstrations of force ([El Nuevo Siglo](#), 2026; [Infobae](#), 2026). Taking together this points to a trend in which the growing volume of

threats reflects not only everyday conflict, but also the consolidation of territorial coercion mechanisms aimed at restricting the freedom of action of citizens and organizations. This, in turn, increases the risk of underreporting and underscores the need for sustained preventive and judicial responses.

3.5 Kidnapping

Between 2024 and 2025, kidnappings increased significantly by 208%, rising from 13 cases to 40 cases. Of the kidnappings recorded in 2025, 25 were carried out with firearms, 13 without the use of weapons, and 2 with bladed or sharp objects. In line with this increase, the 2025 pattern must be interpreted with a key clarification regarding data recording: in police statistics, a portion of cases associated with so-called “extortion kidnapping” or “express kidnapping” (paseo millonario) may not be consolidated under the general kidnapping category, due to the way incidents are operationally classified in reporting systems, even though legally they do constitute extortion kidnapping, as they involve deprivation of liberty for the purpose of obtaining money or other benefits. Even with this caveat, the pattern observed during the year shows a combination of direct intimidation—consistent with the fact that most incidents involved firearms—and non-weapon coercive modalities based on deception and temporary detention.

This includes reported cases in which victims were detained after boarding a taxi in nightlife areas (for example, when leaving Chapinero or along the Zona T corridor) and forced to surrender passwords and have their accounts emptied ([Semana](#), 2026), as well as a case in which a merchant was summoned to a supposed service appointment in La Calera and, once on site, was detained while his family received extortion calls demanding payment ([Caracol Radio](#), 2025). Taken together, this suggests a trend of greater exposure to risk, diversification of scenarios, and the need to strengthen reporting and effective judicialization in order to reduce underreporting and ensure consistent year-on-year comparisons.

3.6 Terrorism

In 2025, no cases of terrorism were recorded in Bogotá according to the official figures consolidated by the National Police of Colombia, maintaining the same trend observed in 2023 and 2024, years in which no incidents classified under this criminal offense were reported in the Statistical, Criminal, Misdemeanor, and Operational Information System (SIEDCO). However, the Annual Report on Security in Bogotá and Colombia prepared by Councilman Julián Espinosa reports 35 cases in 2024 and 33 cases in 2025, revealing a divergence in the figures. This discrepancy can be explained by the operational definition used by each source: while police statistics are strictly based on the legal classification of the crime of terrorism under the Criminal Code and its formal registration in SIEDCO, the council report may be incorporating events such as explosive devices, threats involving explosives, disturbances of public order, or other acts that generate a terrorist impact but are not necessarily legally classified as terrorism.

In this regard, both measurements may be technically valid within their respective conceptual frameworks, underscoring the importance of clearly specifying the methodological definition used when interpreting the figures.

3.7 Commercial Theft

During 2025, 7,652 cases of theft from commercial establishments were reported, reflecting a 25% decrease compared to 2024. However, between 2023 and 2024 there was a 19% increase, rising from 8,617 to 10,240 cases. According to figures from the National Police, 6,460 commercial thefts were carried out without the use of weapons, 545 involved firearms, and 269 involved blunt objects.

In line with this reduction, the behavior observed in 2025 suggests that theft from commercial establishments maintains a primarily opportunistic and low-confrontation dynamic, consistent with the predominance of incidents without the use of weapons, although a higher-risk component persists when firearms are used. The downward trend is associated with targeted interventions in commercial corridors and gastronomic areas, combining patrols and control operations with video surveillance tools (integration of private cameras with the public network) and alarm systems to speed up response times, as well as investigation and intelligence actions aimed at dismantling gangs that repeatedly target specific establishments ([Alcaldía de Bogotá](#), 2025; [Radio Santafé](#), 2025). Even so, the gap between official figures and citizen perception persists—especially in restaurants—, reinforcing the need to sustain prevention measures, reporting, and community–authority coordination in order to consolidate the observed decrease ([El Espectador](#), 2025).

3.8 Carjacking

In 2025, 3,246 cases of motor vehicle theft were reported, reflecting a 20% decrease compared to 2024. Between 2023 and 2024, by contrast, a 6% increase was observed, rising from 3,856 to 4,071 cases. Of the total recorded in 2025, 3,657 occurred without the use of weapons, 2,877 involved the use of a master key, and 2,370 were associated with firearms.

In line with this reduction, motor vehicle theft in 2025 shows a phenomenon that, although lower in volume, maintains persistent operational patterns: on the one hand, opportunistic/towing methods and technical access (such as system manipulation and the use of master keys), which usually occur without direct confrontation; and on the other, robberies involving firearms, which significantly increase the risk to victims ([El Tiempo](#), 2025). In addition, the crime remains strongly linked to the illegal auto-parts economy, explaining the focus of operations on commercial areas and workshops associated with dismantling and fencing, as well as large-scale recoveries of vehicles and parts and actions against establishments that “simulate legality” ([Caracol Radio](#), 2025). Complementarily, authorities have also emphasized that, after the theft, a second victimization may occur through extortion (contacts via social media or WhatsApp demanding

payment for the vehicle's return), reinforcing the importance of not negotiating and reporting immediately ([El Tiempo](#), 2025; [Semana](#), 2026). Finally, as a reference to the continuity and adaptation of the modus operandi (already in 2026), the dismantling of structures that use signal jammers and false documentation/license plates illustrates a level of technical sophistication that requires sustained controls and criminal investigation beyond mere police presence ([La FM](#), 2026).

3.9 Motorcycle Theft

In 2025, 4,708 motorcycle theft cases were recorded, representing a 10% reduction compared to the previous year. However, between 2023 and 2024, a 9% increase was observed, rising from 4,790 to 5,237 cases. Of the total incidents reported in 2025, 2,446 were committed using a master key, 1,619 without the use of weapons, and 533 involved firearms.

Consistent with this reduction, the 2025 trend suggests that motorcycle theft remains predominantly opportunistic and highly mobile, with fast-access techniques such as master keys standing out and, to a significant extent, incidents carried out without weapons. Cases involving firearms point to scenarios of direct intimidation and higher risk for victims. In parallel, enforcement actions have focused on disrupting the entire crime chain—not only theft, but also fencing and the illegal auto-parts market—through inspections of workshops and spare-parts businesses, roadside identification checks, and inter-agency operations that have led to recoveries and arrests during the year ([El Espectador](#), 2025; [Secretaría de Seguridad, Convivencia y Justicia](#), 2025). Additionally, the dismantling of structures combining theft with extortion for vehicle return (online contact, summoning the victim, intimidation, and subsequent payment demands) reinforces the assessment of a phenomenon that adapts and connects with illegal economies linked to dismantling and resale ([El Espectador](#), 2025; [Secretaría de Seguridad, Convivencia y Justicia](#), 2025). Finally, thefts tend to concentrate on high-circulation motorcycle models with strong demand in the illegal spare-parts market—among them the Bajaj Pulsar NS 160 and NS 200, KTM Duke 200, Yamaha FZ16, and Suzuki GN 125—providing further evidence of how parts demand influences target selection ([Caracol Radio](#), 2025).

3.10 Residential Burglary

In 2025, 5,976 residential burglary cases were recorded, representing a 1% decrease compared to 2024. Likewise, between 2023 and 2024 a more pronounced decline of 17% was observed, dropping from 7,302 to 6,028 cases. Of the total incidents in 2025, 4,583 were carried out without the use of weapons, 430 involved blunt objects, and 301 involved the use of crowbars.

In line with this reduction, the 2025 pattern suggests residential burglary increasingly linked to the “opportunity factor” and unsophisticated access techniques, consistent with the predominance of unarmed incidents and the use of tools (blunt objects and crowbars) to breach doors or locks. Moreover, the reported temporal distribution indicates that these events tend to concentrate during periods of low surveillance—

especially early morning and morning hours—with relatively stable daily variation (slight peaks toward Friday/Saturday), reinforcing the logic of exploiting routines and moments of reduced control ([Caracol Radio](#), 2025). Spatially, recurring hotspots are observed in localities such as Suba, Engativá, Kennedy, and Usaquén, while institutional action combines safe zones, mixed patrols, and intelligence efforts, supported by operational results such as the dismantling of criminal structures (e.g., “Los Pasadena”) and arrests in flagrante prompted by community alerts ([Alcaldía de Bogotá](#), 2025). Overall, this points to containment and targeted deterrence rather than the disappearance of the phenomenon, underscoring the need to maintain prevention and rapid response during higher-risk time windows.

3.11 Financial Institution Robbery

In 2025, four cases of theft from financial institutions were recorded, representing a 43% reduction compared to 2024. Likewise, between 2023 and 2024 the decrease was 56%, falling from 16 to 7 cases. All incidents reported in 2025 were carried out without the use of weapons. Additionally, all four cases recorded during the year were concentrated in the first half, with no additional reports in the second half of the period analyzed.

Consistent with this pattern, 2025 reflects a more sporadic phenomenon still associated with recurring actors, where fewer cases coexist with signs of planning and serial activity. Indeed, the dismantling of the “Yoker” group—a structure with defined roles, prior surveillance, and logistics to carry out bank thefts—demonstrates containment and investigative efforts aimed at dismantling networks capable of accumulating multiple incidents across different localities ([Alcaldía de Bogotá](#), 2025). In parallel, operational reports show that when incidents do occur, they tend to trigger rapid responses (e.g., citywide lockdown plans) and arrests, helping explain why 2025 cases were concentrated in the first half of the year with no new reports in the second half. Overall, the sources suggest not the disappearance of the crime, but rather its control and targeted dismantling, consistent with the sustained decline observed since 2023–2024.

3.12 Cargo Theft (Land Piracy)

In 2025, 17 cases of cargo theft were reported, reflecting an 11% decrease compared to 2024. Between 2023 and 2024, however, a 6% increase was recorded, rising from 18 to 19 cases. Of the total incidents in 2025, 13 were carried out using firearms and 2 involved bladed weapons.

In line with these figures, recent reporting shows a more “opportunistic” and mobile form of cargo theft, where offenders combine theft from logistics points (warehouses) with looting of moving trucks to reduce exposure time. In July 2025, for example, police recovered two vehicles and merchandise valued at COP 250 million in Bosa, stolen from a warehouse in Puente Aranda, using cameras, GPS tracking, and a lockdown plan ([Alcaldía de Bogotá](#), 2025). In Barrios Unidos, three men were arrested while extracting cargo from a truck in transit, using disguises to pose as contractors and with possible links to other cases ([El](#)

[Tiempo](#), 2025). At the same time, the transport sector warns that even if the number of incidents declines, the phenomenon continues to have high economic and operational impact, pushing companies to strengthen satellite monitoring, telemetry, and video surveillance to anticipate risk routes and accelerate responses to incidents ([Noticias RCN](#), 2025).

3.13 Sexual Offenses

In 2025, 8,861 cases of sexual offenses were recorded, representing an 8% decrease compared to 2024. However, between 2023 and 2024 a significant 43% increase was observed, rising from 6,782 to 9,668 cases. Of the total complaints in 2025, 8,651 involved no use of weapons, 138 involved bladed or sharp weapons, and 2 were associated with scopolamine.

In this context, and beyond annual variation, the 2025 pattern suggests that sexual offenses and related forms of violence are primarily driven by dynamics of proximity and control—within the household, intimate partner or former partner relationships, and care environments—consistent with the fact that the vast majority of reports involve no weapons. At the territorial level, risk hotspots are identified in localities such as Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy, San Cristóbal, Suba, and Bosa, which account for a substantial share of femicide risk assessments. The National Institute of Legal Medicine has warned of an increase in extreme Risk ([Semana](#), 2025) and the Bogotá City Council has reiterated alerts regarding hundreds of cases of alleged sexual abuse against children and adolescents in 2025. This pattern becomes more critical when incidents occur in institutional settings, such as the case reported in San Cristóbal where a teacher allegedly abused children aged two and three, reinforcing the need for prevention, oversight, and supervision (especially of operators and contractors), as well as a judicial and victim-support response that reduces impunity and effectively protects victims ([Concejo de Bogotá](#), 2025).

4. Risk generating actors and factors

Seizures (kg) of illicit substances in Bogotá

Seized illicit substance	Year 2023 (Kg)	Year 2024 (Kg)	Year 2025 (Kg)
Ecstasy-type stimulant	1.338,20	4.907,80	11.309,00
Compressed marijuana	3.728,02	4.569,25	10.574,71
2CB	19.996,00	12.260,70	11.237,00
Cocaine hydrochloride	1.666,72	2.756,56	3.543,83
Cocaine paste / base	117,49	121,3	143,79
Basuco	338,7	294,25	322,35
Grand total	27.185,13	24.909,86	37.130,68

Source: Prepared by the authors using data from the Colombia Drug Observatory, 2026.

Note: Figures are subject to change based on source update processes.

The number of seizures of different types of illicit substances in Bogotá increased in 2025, rising from 24,909.86 kg to 37,130.68 kg. According to data from the Colombian Drug Observatory, the substances with the highest number of seizure reports were ecstasy-type stimulants (11,309.00 kg), 2CB (11,237.00 kg), and compressed marijuana (10,574.71 kg). Meanwhile, during 2026 to date—cut off as of January 21—a total of 13,428.09 seizures has been recorded.

Micro-trafficking constitutes the central axis of urban violence in Bogotá. According to the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (PARES), activities such as micro-trafficking, extortion, and retail drug dealing are the main sources of financing for these organizations, within an urban environment that offers high profitability for organized crime. This phenomenon is not new, but it has evolved into more complex forms that hinder effective containment. In the San Bernardo sector, for example, a micro-trafficking network was dismantled that used homeless individuals and minors to sell narcotics, controlling at least ten drug distribution points in the area. A particularly concerning element is the increasing autonomy of local criminal structures. According to analyst Andrés Nieto, criminal gangs in Bogotá tend to specialize and do not respond solely to a single macro-structure, unlike what occurs in Medellín or Cali; each structure operates autonomously, and conflicts arise mainly over micro-trafficking in the southern part of the city, which explains the prevalence of score-settling and contract killings ([EL TIEMPO, 2024](#)).

Presence of Criminal Organizations in Bogotá by Locality, 2025

City council members Julián Espinosa and Julián Uscátegui state that the city is at high risk due to the presence of Organized Armed Groups such as the Clan del Golfo, FARC dissident groups, and the ELN; approximately 205 Organized Common Crime Groups, including Los Espartanos, Los Pelados, La Oficina de San Andresito, the Tren de Aragua, the Nueva Junta Directiva del Narcotráfico, and Los Motorratones; as well as Organized Crime Groups such as Los Paisas, the Tren de Aragua, and Los Boyacos, mainly engaged in micro-trafficking, theft, and extortion ([Bogotá Alerta, 2025](#); y [Concejo de Bogotá, 2025](#)). Reports from both the council members and PARES indicate that these structures not only subcontract among themselves, but are also constantly in conflict over territorial control, which has a direct negative impact on the population. The vast majority of active criminal organizations across different localities of Bogotá and its metropolitan area are present in Tunjuelito, Los Mártires, Antonio Nariño, Puente Aranda, Santa Fe, Teusaquillo, Chapinero, and Barrios Unidos ([Concejo de Bogotá, 2025](#)).

Likewise, warnings of potential threats from criminal organizations and cases of voter intimidation increased in the period immediately preceding the presidential and legislative elections. These dynamics are particularly evident in central areas of the capital, where territorial disputes between illegal armed groups are ongoing. Territorial competition among criminal structures has acquired a political dimension of particular severity in the context of the 2026 electoral cycle. The Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), represented by Iris Marín, has reiterated warnings about potential threats to electoral processes, identifying the localities of Santa Fe and Los Mártires as critical epicenters, where the Clan del Golfo and the Tren de Aragua are engaged in direct confrontation. Candidates such as Carolina Arbeláez, from Bogotá Entre Todos, have described this situation as a direct attack on democracy, calling for immediate investigations and security guarantees for candidates and campaign teams ([EL PAÍS, 2026](#)).

Territorial disputes—particularly between the Tren de Aragua and the Clan del Golfo—operate under a subcontracting model in which these large criminal structures rely on local gangs to contest territory and expand their criminal revenues. This model renders violence more diffuse, less predictable, and more difficult to attribute institutionally, while the absence of the state in certain areas has enabled these organizations to provide pseudo-state services—such as informal justice, public works, and employment—thereby consolidating forms of criminal governance that erode institutional legitimacy. Additionally, a new criminal dynamic has emerged among former members of the Tren de Aragua, whose dissident factions have carried out contract killings as anti-Tren cells, intensifying the conflict in a manner similar to the split of the EMC in 2024 ([SEMANA, 2026](#)).

5. Impact of Crime

Political

The presence of multiple armed structures in Bogotá represents a direct threat to the integrity of the 2026 electoral process. Pressure on candidates, voter intimidation, and the capture of certain areas of the city by criminal groups erode the quality of local democracy and generate a crisis of institutional legitimacy. Similarly, the Petro administration’s “Total Peace” policy has been questioned as a factor that may have facilitated the strengthening of these structures by granting them recognition without requiring genuine commitments to de-escalation. For the public policy sector, this implies an urgent need to align security strategies with peace negotiations, preventing ceasefires from becoming windows of territorial expansion for armed groups.

Economic

For the first time, the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce measured whether extortion victims were businesses, finding that 31.7% of the victims were associated with a commercial activity ([Cámara de](#)

[Comercio de Bogotá](#), 2025) Although extortion decreased by 16% in 2025, the persistence of this crime—and the fact that nearly one-third of victims are business actors—creates distortions in local markets, pressures micro-business closures, and discourages both formal investment and employment formalization. Organized crime imposes invisible costs on the productive sector: expenditures on private security, losses due to theft, closure of establishments in high-conflict areas, and the relocation of operations. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), which account for the majority of employment in Bogotá, are the most exposed.

Social

In 2025, 43.6% of Bogotá residents stated that the neighborhood in which they live is safe, representing a noticeable improvement in perception. Nevertheless, 66% of citizens believe that overall insecurity in Bogotá has increased, and 51.9% reported frequently seeing violent content on digital platforms, with social media becoming the primary source of information on security for the first time, at 61.4% ([El Nuevo Siglo](#), 2026) This phenomenon amplifies risk perception beyond actual victimization, undermines trust in public space, and influences decisions related to mobility, consumption, and business location. The use of minors and homeless populations as instruments of micro-trafficking further exacerbates the social impact on vulnerable communities.

Technological

Cybercrime is emerging as the fastest-growing threat vector. Nineteen point five percent (19.5%) of citizens reported having been affected by cybercrime, with the most common modality being the receipt of fraudulent text messages, accounting for 43.7% ([Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá](#), 2026). For the business sector, this entails greater investment in cybersecurity, identity-verification protocols, and fraud-management mechanisms. The creation of shell companies with a legal appearance—such as those detected in operations by the Bogotá Metropolitan Police to acquire chemical supplies and manufacture explosives—demonstrates that criminal groups also exploit gaps in corporate oversight frameworks, using the formal economy as a shield.

The concentration of violence in peripheral localities such as Ciudad Bolívar, Rafael Uribe, and Suba, as well as in central areas like Santa Fe and Los Mártires, shapes geographies of risk that constrain equitable urban development. Territorial control by armed groups over certain road corridors and commercial areas discourages investment in zones that could otherwise have potential for economic revitalization. Competition over drug distribution areas also places pressure on educational and community environments, affecting quality of life and living conditions in high-density neighborhoods. Similarly, weaknesses in the judicial system—underreporting of crimes, perceived impunity, and prison conditions—reduce the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement actions. Twenty-nine point

five percent (29.5%) of extortion victims reported having complied with the demanded payment ([Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 2026](#)), reflecting both a lack of trust in institutional reporting channels and the coercive effectiveness of criminal groups. For businesses, this translates into a complex compliance environment, where the risk of extortion may lead to informal payment practices that, in turn, expose them to investigations for financing criminal organizations. Public policy therefore requires reforms that strengthen the judicial response, reduce impunity, and integrate operational actions with sustained social-prevention strategies.

6. Recommendations

- If you are threatened by an Organized Criminal Group (OCG), refrain from discussing the matter with third parties and immediately report the situation to the competent authorities (GAULA Police and/or the Army).
- In the event of an extortion call, remain on the line, record relevant details, do not provide personal information, and, if possible, record the communication to later report it to the authorities.
- Avoid storing personal or sensitive information about your loved ones on your mobile phone.
- Avoid walking during the early morning hours in areas that, according to crime records, have high crime rates or a strong presence of criminal organizations.
- Stay informed about public order and mobility conditions in the city, especially during strikes or demonstrations, and have alternative travel plans ready.
- If you face a robbery, “paseo millonario,” or “fleteo” situation, do not resist and prioritize your physical safety.
- Put your phone away when in public spaces, remain alert to your surroundings, and avoid any unnecessary distractions.
- Since homicides tend to be concentrated in specific areas, identify those high-risk zones and avoid passing through them, as you could become involved in gang confrontations or violent incidents in public spaces.
- Never provide personal or banking information by phone, text message, or email; carry out any financial procedures directly with your bank.

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