

Editorial 3+

Your analysis of the global political and security situation



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A man in a green jacket is speaking in front of an American flag and a shield with the number '3+' on it. The background is dark with some lights.

Disputes between the United States and NATO member states over interests in Greenland

Source: Townhall, 2025

The growing strategic relevance of the Arctic has placed Greenland at the center of a complex international landscape.

As the world's largest island, with an area of 2.1 million km² and the planet's second-largest ice sheet, its value is twofold: its location is critical for the control of emerging routes and global security, and its subsoil contains highly valuable natural resources, including critical minerals, oil, gas, and significant hydroelectric potential (National Geographic, 2026). Politically, it is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, managing its internal affairs while remaining dependent on Copenhagen for defense and foreign policy. The United States' historical interest in the island—exemplified by the Pituffik base and the former Iceworm project—underscores its view of Greenland as a vital defense asset.

Recent statements regarding a potential acquisition or military action are framed within this perception, now intensified by competition over resources and accelerated ice melt (La Tercera, 2026).

This interest has generated diplomatic tension, with diverging positions. On one hand, a joint statement by European leaders (Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom) and the Danish Prime Minister asserts that security in the Arctic

must be achieved collectively within NATO, while respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, emphasizing that “Greenland belongs to its people” (Oficina del primer ministro, 2026). On the other hand, senior U.S. officials have justified a potential action regarding the island as a 'national security priority,' citing shortcomings in the current regional management (Los Andes, 2026).

Actions such as the uncoordinated visit to Pituffik in 2025 are perceived by Denmark as unilateralism that bypasses consultation with an ally. Since both countries are NATO members, this disagreement poses an unprecedented challenge to the Alliance's principles of consultation and collective defense (El Confidencial, 2026).

A conflict scenario between NATO allies would entail unique considerations. Militarily, the disparity in capabilities is overwhelming, and the prior U.S. presence would facilitate a deployment. However, the consequences would extend far beyond: an annexation would trigger a deep diplomatic crisis with Denmark, within the European Union, and across the transatlantic architecture, undermining the foundations of NATO.



Globally, it would alter the balance in the Arctic, intensify competition with other powers, and set a dangerous precedent (France24, 2026). Furthermore, it would have critical ramifications: while the United States would gain access to vast resources, the acceleration of industrial and military activity could exacerbate the environmental crisis with global impacts. For the Greenlandic population, predominantly Inuit, a dilemma would arise between potential economic benefits and the loss of autonomy and cultural identity. Local authorities have downplayed this possibility, reflecting the disruptive nature it would have on the international order and regional stability (AS, 2026).



Regional

On Monday, January 5, Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as the first president of Venezuela, following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by the United States Delta Force and his

transfer to New York to be tried for narco-terrorism and organized violence. This has represented changes and uncertainty within Venezuela and internationally regarding how the country is managed. Likewise, the course of action in Venezuelan foreign policy is in transition according to the U.S. and the new president Rodríguez, whom the U.S. government has supported to some extent for being able to maintain national stability and control the Venezuelan Armed Forces.

Especially because the command in the hands of Delcy and Padrino López — by extension of the military apparatus — maintains the respect of the state's armed branch. This continues to be fundamental for stability since the Venezuelan state has moved from being a personalist regime, as it was in the first wave under Chávez, to being sustained by a series of groups that maintain state social cohesion. Although several groups are fighting to seize that power, the structure continues to hold (La Silla Vacía, 2026). This can even be read as part of the United States' objective with the operation to extract Maduro, which was surgical, met with little resistance, and deliberately left the state structure intact to avoid the imbalance and chaos that a power vacuum initially generates.

The New Wave of Chavismo in Venezuela



Source: El Litoral, 2026

In this context, the new wave of Chavismo under Delcy Rodríguez opens a window of opportunity for a potential change during what is expected to be a transitional period. While Maduro's departure does not mark the end of Chavismo, it does allow for some loosening of authoritarianism and an economic opening, which Delcy signals by supporting commercial and energy agreements with the U.S., even as she condemns the military intervention — a duality that blends pragmatism with continuity.


However, it is important to remember that Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Republican spokesperson in Congress, clarified that the operation against Maduro was not intended as a regime change, but rather aimed at demanding a shift in behavior from the political regime in Venezuela (EL MUNDO, 2026). This reflects a complex relationship of

power and interests, both within the regime and in the government of Donald Trump. Likewise, it remains highly precarious to consider any progress toward a democratic transition, as censorship, political persecution, systematic violations of fundamental rights, lack of transparency, absence of checks and balances, and other key elements of freedom and order through justice rather than violence persist. This has been evident, for example, in the harassment of the press under Rodríguez's orders to maintain stability and control of the country, leading journalists to adopt self-censorship, while traditional media outlets have been weakened or closed to uphold the regime's narrative (EL MUNDO, 2026).

In summary, it has become evident that the new wave of Chavismo is immediately backed by a restructured institutional framework after the crisis, with strict internal control and classic Venezuelan government security and repression measures to maintain state stability.

A close-up photograph of the American flag on the left and the Venezuelan flag on the right. The American flag features white stars on a blue field and red and white stripes. The Venezuelan flag has horizontal stripes of yellow, blue, and red, with a white arc containing a star. The flags are draped and appear to be made of a textured fabric.

At the same time, it faces significant challenges in remaining in power in the medium and even short term, due to a dual strategy of opening diplomatic and commercial channels with the United States while clinging to the ideals of Chavismo and Madurismo; this could balance the internal loyalty of key agents such as the military and become a turning point toward a possible controlled transition. Finally, it is worth highlighting the role of Diosdado Cabello as the main disruptive actor in the U.S. plan in Venezuela and the biggest obstacle to the current regime's stability amid such uncertainty and volatility. This is especially true because Cabello controls the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and exerts influence over armed colectivos and paramilitary groups, thus consolidating himself as the decisive factor and the greatest challenge for Delcy Rodríguez's government and Venezuelan politics to remain in power (Infobae, 2026).



Outlook on Armed Groups That May Migrate to Colombia After the Tense Situation in Venezuela

LOCAL

Following the U.S. incursion in Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro, a scenario of high tension has been created that is driving the forced migration of Organized Armed Groups (OAGs) toward Colombia. Groups such as the ELN and FARC dissidents, which for years operated with relative impunity under state protection in Venezuela, now find themselves forced into a hurried return. The sudden foreign military presence and the collapse of their support network have left them exposed, destabilizing the already fragile security balance in the border region. An intelligence report cited by Infobae details the magnitude of this threat, estimating the presence of more than 6,000 ELN combatants and at least 186 of its key leaders in Venezuelan territory, who are now evaluating their return (Europa Press, 2026).

In response to this imminent threat, the Colombian state has deployed a preventive military operation. The National Army has mobilized 30,000 soldiers along the 2,219-kilometer border, prioritizing critical areas in the departments of La Guajira, Norte de Santander, and Arauca (MSN, 2026). This operation, which includes reinforcement of key points such as international bridges, seeks to contain the infiltration of these armed groups and manage the security situation amid a massive migratory flow. The objective is clear: to shield the national territory against a potential violent reconfiguration of transnational organized crime.

This security challenge is complicated by the binational nature of these structures. The ELN, in particular, operates as an organization with established infrastructure and logistical networks on both sides of the border, especially in the Catatumbo region (Colombia) and Zulia (Venezuela), from where it manages drug trafficking and its armed operations. Similarly, the Segunda Marquetalia maintained refuge and illicit economic activities in Venezuela.

According to Colombian President Gustavo Petro, this has represented a threat to citizens given the most recent message from Iván

'Similarly, the Segunda Marquetalia maintained refuge and illicit economic activities in Venezuela.'

Mordisco, leader of the FARC dissidents, who proposed a summit of crime groups to confront the U.S. military operation in Venezuela and thus form what he considers a 'regional insurgent bloc (MSN, 2026). Therefore, their return does not represent a simple relocation, but rather the reactivation of their offensive capabilities within Colombia, which anticipates an increase in territorial conflicts between groups and a worsening of violence in the border areas.



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