

Editorial 3+

Your analysis of the global political and security situation



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Is Trumps '20-point Gaza peace plan' truly the definitive solution to end the disputes between Hamas and Israel?

Source: France24, 2023

The 'peace plan for Gaza' proposed by President Donald Trump seeks to end the conflict between Hamas and Israel two

years after its formal inception through an immediate ceasefire agreement, the release of Palestinian and Israeli hostages, the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and the creation of a transitional government under the supervision of an international 'Peace Board' chaired by Trump¹. It also envisages the demilitarization of Gaza to neutralize Hamas' military capabilities and focuses on the economic development and reconstruction of Gaza.

In addition, it stipulates that Israel would not occupy or annex Gaza, which represents a new development in the conflict, as this has been a major point of contention. However, its implementation depends on acceptance by all parties involved, especially Hamas, which has expressed reservations and rejection of conditions that do not fully address Palestinian sovereignty. This is key because the agreement does not contemplate the political participation of Hamas, or even the Palestinian Authority (PA), whose president, although he does not have popular support, he is internationally recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people.

Although it proposes to transfer the authority of the 'Peace Board' to the PA, it does not say when or under what conditions². This suggests the need for a broader dialogue that includes all Palestinian factions for sovereignty and self-government. This creates a climate of uncertainty about the real viability of the plan to end the conflict. Especially because, although the first phase of the plan has already been signed, the crossfire between the two sides continues.

In addition, Israel's historical allies distanced themselves from Netanyahu and recognized the Palestinian State to pressure him to seek alternative solutions. Political isolation reduced his room for maneuvering, forcing him to negotiate. Even Israeli society itself, tired of the conflict, took to the streets to demand an end to the war. For his part, Trump's role as mediator was crucial to diplomatic progress. The loss of international support following the attack on Qatar made it untenable to continue with 'diplomacy by force,' increasing the political and strategic cost for Netanyahu³.

The background of the page features a stylized representation of the Israeli flag, with horizontal stripes of orange, white, green, and blue. A diagonal red stripe is visible on the left side. Overlaid on this background is a dark, textured rectangular area containing white text. A black silhouette of barbed wire runs diagonally across the lower half of the image, starting from the bottom left and extending towards the center right.

This affects global and regional power dynamics, strategic alliances, and international perceptions of justice and peace in the Middle East, with an impact on stability and security and intelligence collaboration in the region. However, these complexities mean that the definitive end to the conflict between Hamas and Israel remains uncertain, even with agreements in place, because they do not resolve the ideological war and respond to very disparate belief systems in a regional environment that remains hostile. Finally, it is still unclear how the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state could either put the agreement on hold and fuel future conflicts or serve as a cornerstone for dissipating the waves of violence, but it is clear that it will be a key element in the unfolding of the peace plan.



Regional

How could the intention to share military information with Venezuela impact Colombia amid tensions between Venezuela and the United States?

President Gustavo Petro has emphasized the need to share military information with Venezuela to combat terrorism in Catatumbo.

These statements made at the last Council of Ministers meeting have caused concern in military and defense circles due to the possible exposure of strategic data on the Colombian air force and radars, which could weaken the country's security and integrity in the face of illegal armed groups operating on the border⁴. This is mainly because the Venezuelan regime's intelligence and counterintelligence agencies do not act in accordance with democratic principles but rather have a more repressive function and face difficulties in terms of internal coordination and articulation⁵.

Furthermore, there are investigations that indicate that the Maduro regime is involved in the drug trafficking business and has favored GAOs, such as the ELN, which uses Venezuelan territory as an area of expansion and strategic territory, controlling economic corridors that are very important for illegal activities, such as the illicit exploitation of minerals and cocaine trafficking between the two countries⁶.



Source: The New York Times, 2025.

For example, mining is supported by the Venezuelan National Guard, and those who initially removed groups such as the ELN and the Segunda Marquetalia from the area now allegedly charge 'vaccines' to miners in the area, profiting from illegal gold mining⁷. Therefore, there is a latent risk, beyond reputational damage.

Although the idea of border integration is necessary for the well-being of the population, through the economy, health, and education, as proposed in the Binational Zone of 'Peace, Unity and Development.' This is based on a basic principle: to integrate borders, you must first control them. It should be noted that Colombia does not exercise effective control over its border, while Venezuela has delegated that control to organized crime⁸, creating greater uncertainty for national security.

Along these lines, another drawback that must be considered is that authoritarian regimes such as Venezuela's are not reliable allies. This is because they do not have checks and balances, they lack an independent business sector that does not owe its loyalty to the government, and state decisions are based on Nicolás Maduro's preferences rather than on the welfare of the country. Thus, the disclosure of classified national security information should be done with an ally that can be trusted, when there is certainty that such agreements will be honored⁹.

Additionally, this military cooperation with Venezuela could negatively affect Colombia's relations with strategic allies, who could suspend military cooperation and limit support in defense, technology and resources, because Colombia is more than a NATO Global Partner, it is also a non-NATO military ally of the United States and an indispensable partner for multiple states¹⁰.



Even despite the United States' decertification of Colombia, the military forces continue to receive economic aid because, for the United States, we still maintain a fundamental relationship. This puts Colombia's strategic position in the region and its ability to confront transnational threats under strain. On the other hand, the United States' formal declaration of being in a 'non-international armed conflict' against drug cartels operating in the Caribbean marks a radical change in its anti-drug strategy, moving from police operations, with a focus on seizures and crop eradication, to lethal military actions using conventional armed forces, armed drones and naval attacks, with an emphasis on vessels operating near Venezuela.

In summary, the United States' war against cartels in the Caribbean is militarizing the region, with the potential for escalating violence and tensions. Meanwhile, Colombia's cooperation with Venezuela in sharing military information is impacting Colombia's national security and international relations, with the risk of losing support and becoming more vulnerable to transnational threats in a highly volatile regional scenario.

What are the implications of Colombia
no longer having a flexible credit line
with the IMF, and how might this affect
human security in the country?
Stability risks...

LOCAL

Colombia has opted to terminate its Flexible Credit Line (FCL) agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) early,

effective 1 October 2025, considering it more as a stability backstop than a typical loan. This decision is based on the current strength of the country's liquidity and international reserves, which almost reached \$65.5 billion¹¹. Likewise, the IMF itself forecasts that the Colombian economy will grow by 2.5% in 2025. It also takes into account the suspension of access to FCL resources since April 2025 because the IMF concluded that Colombia no longer fully meets the criteria for a sound economic policy framework, especially in terms of fiscal policy and the Colombian economy's capacity to pay.

In view of this situation, the administration decided to permanently cancel the mechanism, thus ending more than ten years in which Colombia was part of an exclusive group of economies rated as reliable by the international entity¹². The cancellation means that Colombia loses immediate financial backing to deal with external crises, which may increase its vulnerability to economic shocks and make access to international resources more expensive. This is because the LCF functioned as a 'lifeline' for Colombia, guaranteeing rapid access to dollars in emergencies. So, rather than a risk for Gustavo Petro's administration, it is a risk for future governments.

'Maintaining it meant paying excessive commissions that were not advantageous.'

Finance Minister Germán Ávila pointed out that the administration had already expressed its lack of interest in continuing with this line: 'Maintaining it meant paying excessive commissions that were not advantageous¹³.' Without this backing, Colombia will likely face higher financing costs and an increase in risk premiums, which could affect macroeconomic stability in scenarios of global uncertainty or regional instability.

Given that the biggest problem is not losing capital, as current liquidity is good, but rather losing the confidence that the LCF gave investors, since being a symbol of economic strength made the country more attractive to foreign investment, without it the country depends too much on its fiscal and political decisions to maintain that confidence in the market.





Source: Dahana Ospina/INFOBAE 2025

This would indicate the need for structural adjustments to regain the confidence of international organizations.

This could lead to higher tax burdens and costs associated with external financing, which could limit the government's ability to invest in social programs, health, education and social protection, all of which are essential for improving the living conditions of the population and maintaining the current government's voter base.

Furthermore, in the event of future economic or financial crises, the absence of immediate financial support could result in budget cuts or difficulties in sustaining public policies that mitigate poverty and inequality, particularly affecting vulnerable sectors¹⁴. Despite economic growth, regional and social disparities persist, making it difficult to guarantee full economic security.

Although the state has made progress in structural policies, food insecurity, poverty, and lack of social mobility remain challenges, exacerbated by factors such as violence and failure to execute budgets.

Even so, according to Ávila, this was only one of several financing alternatives available to Colombia, and since Colombia did not intend to use the credit, its cancellation does not affect next year's budget estimate. Although the minister stated that, should exceptional situations arise, there is a 'cushion' that provides security for the country and the markets, the government's human security and development policy, as well as the state's capacity, depend on the fiscal and financial context, which now faces greater restrictions.

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